We Discuss Benefits of Federal Information Security Legislation on Fox
Earlier this week we blogged about Senator Blumenthal's (D-CT) proposed Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2011. Today, InfoLawGroup partner Boris Segalis spoke on Fox Live about the advantages of federal information security legislation.
Personal Data Protections Expand in Korea
Mr. Kwang Hyun Ryoo, a partner at the Korean law firm of Bae, Kim & Lee LLC, is reporting in the firm’s newsletter that on March 29, 2011, Korea enacted a comprehensive personal data protection law, entitled Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA). Most of the act's provisions will come into force on September 30, 2011.
According to Mr. Ryoo, the new law extends data protection requirements across a broad spectrum of information processing. Mr. Ryoo notes that whereas the scope of existing data protection statutes is limited to certain entities and types of information, PIPA broadly governs the collection and processing of any personal data, by private and public entities.
Generally, PIPA requires the individual’s informed consent for any collection, use or disclosure of personal information. The law, however, provides for a number of exceptions to the consent requirement. The new law also puts limits on the amount of personal data that individuals may be required to provide.
PIPA applies broadly to "personal information" processed by any entity deemed to be a “handler” of personal information.” PIPA defines “personal information” as any information from which, by itself or combined with other information, an individual can be identified, whether from the individual’s name, identification number, image or other attributes. A “handler” of personal information is any entity, company, government organization, individual or other person that, directly or through a third party, handles personal information for business purposes. PIPA applies to both electronically and manually recorded information.
Remedies for data protection violations include the right to seek class action mediation and litigation.
For detailed analysis of PIPA’s provisions, please refer to Mr. Ryoo’s article.
InfoLawGroup Says:
As more and more countries adopt comprehensive data protection laws that often incorporate EU-like provisions, the compliance equation gets more complicated for companies operating worldwide. Many of these laws share common elements, such as notice, consent, choice, access and data security. You also can find these elements articulated in the Federal Trade Commission's Fair Information Practice Principles. Structuring your company's personal information practices around these elements should help in achieving compliance in the U.S. as well as in foreign jurisdictions.
FTC Takes a Big Step in Privacy Enforcement with Google Buzz Settlement
The Google Buzz settlement that the Federal Trade Commission announced on March 30, 2011 is the latest in the line of the Commission’s numerous Section 5 actions related to privacy and data security violations. The Google Buzz settlement, however, is unique in several important ways. The settlement represents:
- The first FTC settlement order has requires a company to implement a comprehensive privacy program to protect the privacy of consumers’ information; and
- FTC’s first substantive U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework enforcement action.
Let’s dive in (make sure to read the "Action Item" at the conclusion of the post!):
Factual Allegations
The FTC alleged in its complaint that Google violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by engaging in deceptive tactics and violating its own privacy promises to consumers in connection with the launch of the company’s social network, Google Buzz, in 2010. The FTC also alleged that with respect to the data of its European users, Google violated the Notice and Choice principles of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor self-regulatory framework for cross-border data transfer, in violation of the company’s certification of adherence to the framework.
The FTC alleged that when Google launched Buzz, the company used its customers’ email contact lists to populate the social network. As a result, by default, when Buzz launched, Gmail users became social network “followers” of other users – including those in their email contact lists – and were “followed” by their contacts. While Google's set-up process appeared to provide users with choices not to enroll in Buzz (such as “Nah, go to my inbox” and “Turn off Buzz”), the FTC alleged that selecting those options did not actually opt the users out of Buzz.. Instead, users continued to be followers of and followed by other Gmail users. Gmail users complained that the automatic generation of follower lists resulted, in some cases, in users following and being followed by individuals against whom they obtained restraining orders, abusive ex-spouses, clients of mental health professionals and attorneys, and job recruiters.
The FTC also alleged that Google did not adequately inform users that their previously private information, such as their contact lists and profiles, would become public by default when they used Buzz. According to the FTC, Goggle did not provide clear means for users to change privacy settings to prevent the public disclosure of this information.
The FTC further alleged that the launch of Buzz resulted in the disclosure of personal information that was contrary to the users’ specific choices. For example, if a Gmail user blocked another individual from Google Chat, that individual could still be a follower of the user on Buzz. Further, Buzz users did not have the ability to block followers who did not have a public Google profile. Finally, a flawed design of the Buzz comment reply mechanism resulted in broad disclosure of users’ private email addresses.
Violations of the FTC Act
The FTC alleged that that Google’s handling of privacy settings in connection with the launch of Buzz (as described above) violated the company’s own privacy notices and Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibition against unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Specifically, according to the FTC, Google:
- By using Gmail information to populate Buzz -- failed to abide by the pledge in the company’s privacy policy to use information from consumers signing up for Gmail only for the purpose of providing them with a web-based email service;
- By using Gmail information in connection with Buzz -- failed to abide by the pledge in the company’s privacy policy to seek users’ consent to use their information for a purpose other than that for which the data was collected; and
- By not respecting user’s privacy choices (such as “Nah, go to my inbox” and “Turn off Buzz”), and misleading users about what information in their profiles would become public and which of their contact lists would become public in connection with Buzz – engaged in deceptive acts or practices.
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework Violations
The Google Buzz settlement is the FTC’s first substantive U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework enforcement action in which the Commission alleged specific violations of the Safe Harbor privacy principles. On several previous occasions, the FTC took enforcement action against companies that claimed to be Safe Harbor certified but were not in fact members of the program. Google maintained an up-to-date Safe Harbor self-certification on the U.S. Department of Commerce Safe Harbor list and stated in its privacy policy that it adhered to the Safe Harbor privacy principles.
The Safe Harbor framework consists of a set of privacy principles developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in collaboration with the European Commission. The framework is intended to provide U.S. companies with a mechanism for receiving personal information from the European Union, European Economic Area or Switzerland in compliance with the European Commission’s Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection. U.S. companies that participate in the Safe Harbor framework are deemed by the European Commission and the Information Commission of Switzerland to provide an “adequate” level of privacy protection, enabling the certified U.S. companies to receive and process European data in the U.S.
Among other provisions, the Safe Harbor privacy principles require companies that receive European personal data in the U.S. to give the individuals to whom the information pertains:
- Notice of how the company uses their personal information (the Notice principle);
- Choice to direct the company to refrain from sharing the information with certain third parties (the Choice principle); and
- The opportunity to opt out of having their information used for purposes incompatible with those for which the information was collected or to which they have consented (also the Choice principle).
In practice, a Safe Harbor-certified company in the U.S. that wishes to use or disclose personal data of European residents for purposes incompatible with the purposes for which the information was collected or to which the users have consented, must (i) provide users with a notice of the proposed new use or disclosure, and (ii) give users an opportunity to direct the company not to use or disclose the information in the proposed manner.
The FTC alleged that Google relied on its Safe Harbor certification to transfer data collected from Gmail users from Europe to the United States for processing. According to the FTC, the company also processed this information in connection with the launch of Buzz. The complaint alleged that Google violated the Notice and Choice principles by not giving European users notice before using their Gmail information in connection with Buzz. Google’s alleged non-compliance with the Safe Harbor Notice and Choice principles constituted a deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
Settlement
The FTC has billed this enforcement action as a “tough settlement that ensures that Google will honor its commitments to consumers and build strong privacy protections into all of its operations.” The settlement includes several major requirements.
Prohibition Against Misrepresentations
The settlement prohibits Google from misrepresenting the company's privacy practices with respect to “covered information” or the company’s compliance with any privacy, security or other compliance program, including the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework. Importantly, the term “covered information” is broader than the term “personal information” that the FTC has used in its previous privacy enforcement consent orders. “Covered information” includes not only the traditional personal information elements (e.g., name, postal or email address, and telephone number), but also an IP address or an individual’s physical location or list of contacts. The broader definition of “covered information” is consistent with the FTC’s increasingly expansive view of the information associated with an individual that warrants protection. For example, in its report on Self-Regulatory Principles For Online Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology, the FTC refused to provide a bright line rule for delineating personal and non-personal information. Instead, the FTC took the position that behavioral advertising principles "should apply to data that could reasonably be associated with a particular consumer or computer or other device, regardless of whether the data is 'personally identifiable' in the traditional sense." Similarly, the FTC’s report on “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers ("Privacy Report"), argued for protecting consumer data that can reasonably be linked to a specific consumer, computer or device.
Notice and Consent
The settlement requires Google to provide its users with notice and choice prior to sharing users’ information with third parties in certain circumstances. Specifically, if the proposed disclosure is contrary to the data sharing practices Google represented to be in effect at the time the information was collected, the settlement requires Google to give users a clear and prominent notice of the proposed disclosure and to obtain their “express affirmative consent.” While the settlement does not define “express affirmative consent,” at a minimum, this provision will require Google to offer users a prominent, transparent means for exercising their privacy choices.
Comprehensive Privacy Program
The FTC stated that the Buzz settlement is the first to require a company to implement a comprehensive privacy program to protect the privacy of consumers’ information. The inclusion of his requirement in the settlement appears to be the first application of the “privacy by design” philosophy that the Commission articulated in its Privacy Report. The FTC’s “privacy by design” approach calls on companies to build privacy protections into their business practices. Such protections should include sound mechanisms for allowing consumers to exercise their privacy choices, reasonable security for consumer data, limited collection and retention of consumer data, secure disposal of the data, and reasonable procedures to promote data accuracy. The report also called for companies to implement and enforce procedurally sound privacy practices throughout the organizations, including by assigning personnel to oversee privacy issues, training employees and conducting privacy reviews for new products and services.
The settlement requires Google to maintain a written, comprehensive privacy program that is reasonably designed to (i) address privacy risks related to the development and management of new and existing products and services, and (ii) protect the privacy and confidentiality of covered information (as defined above). Goggle must include in its privacy program the privacy controls and procedures appropriate to the company's size and complexity, the nature and scope of its activities, and the nature of covered information.
Specifically, the settlement requires Google to:
- Designate staff responsible for the privacy program;
- Conduct a risk assessment to identify reasonably-foreseeable risks that could result in the unauthorized collection, use, or disclosure of covered information and assess the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control these risks;
- Design and implement reasonable privacy procedures to control the risks identified through the privacy risk assessment;
- Regularly test or monitor the effectiveness of the program’s key privacy controls and procedures;
- Develop and use reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of appropriately protecting the privacy of covered information they receive from Google;
- Require relevant service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate privacy protections; and
- Evaluate and adjust the company's privacy program in light of the results of the testing and monitoring, any material changes to the company's operations or business arrangements, or any other circumstances that may have a material impact on the effectiveness of the company’s privacy program.
Compliance Requirements
In addition to the specific requirements regarding the company’s privacy practices, the settlement mandates a compliance and reporting program, including biennial assessments and reports from a qualified, objective and independent third-party professional. The reports must certify, among other things, that:
- Google has in place a privacy program that provides protections that meet or exceed the protections required by the settlement order; and
- Google’s privacy controls are operating with sufficient effectiveness to provide reasonable assurance that the privacy of covered information is protected.
Google must retain the materials relied upon to prepare the third-party assessments for a period of three years from the date of the assessment.
The settlement also requires Google to:
- Retain all “widely disseminated statements” that describe the extent to which the company maintains and protects the privacy and confidentiality of any covered information, along with all materials relied upon in making or disseminating such statements, for a period of three years;
- Retain for a period of six months (i) all consumer complaints directed at Google, or forwarded to Google by a third party, that allege unauthorized collection, use or disclosure of covered information and (ii) any responses to such complaints;
- Retain for a period of five years documents that contradict, qualify or call into question the company’s compliance with the terms of the settlement;
- Disseminate the consent order to the company’s current and future principals, officers, directors and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents and representatives who have supervisory responsibilities relating to covered information; and
- Notify the FTC of changes in the company’s corporate status.
Action Item
As we often note on this blog, privacy enforcement activity is rising exponentially, whether in the format of state and federal regulatory actions, class action suits, media exposés or public admonitions by regulators. This enforcement activity presents a significant risk to companies whose business models rely heavily on the collection, use or disclosure of information associated with individuals. If your company has not already done so, now is the perfect time to review the company’s privacy and information security practices, conduct a privacy and information security assessment, and take steps to ensure that the company’s practices comply with the various privacy and information security requirements, including FTC guidance.
U.S. Department of Energy Takes on Smart Grid Security
On February 1, 2011, the Department of Energy announced the launch of the Cyber Security Initiative to develop cyber security risk management process guidelines for the electric grid. The Department’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability will lead the effort in collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
The core team has invited stakeholders from across the utility sector to participate in the initiative, including representatives from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Department of Homeland Security, and both publicly and privately-owned utilities. The proposed guidelines will seek to provide utilities a flexible, fundamental approach to managing cyber security risks through a three-tiered approach, addressing risks at the (i) organization level; (ii) business process level; and (iii) information systems level. The guidelines will allow utilities to better understand cyber security risks, assess their severity, and allocate resources to more efficiently manage the risks.
The initiative will produce a draft guideline document that will be available for public review and comment, and then finalized and issued by the group.
Action Item: For more on privacy and information security issues affecting the smart grid, please join us for a free webinar on February 24, 2011 from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. EST. To register, please email Boris Segalis at bsegalis@infolawgroup.com.
Please Tune In Monday, January 31, 2011
I hope you will tune in Monday, January 31, 2011, 8-9 am Pacific (11-12 Eastern), to Privacy Piracy, audio streaming on www.kuci.org (or locally in Southern California on KUCI 88.9 FM in Irvine, CA). Mari Frank will interview me about the following topics and more:
- If an organization has the time and resources to do only one thing to improve its privacy and data security compliance programs in 2011, what should that one thing be?
- What are the hottest topics in information law in 2011?
- What can an organization using or considering using cloud services do today to protect itself?
New York's Electronic Equipment Recycling and Reuse Act
Little covered other than by environmental and waste industry trade journals, New York's legislature earlier this year passed the NYS Electronic Equipment Recycling and Reuse Act (the “Act”), which was signed into law by Governor Paterson. The Act amended various provisions of the NY Tax Law as well as adding Article 27, Title 26, Electronic Equipment Recycling and Reuse, to New York's Environmental Conservation Law. It contains some potential surprises for manufacturers, retailers and consumers of "covered electronic equipment." The manufacturer's internet website must, in addition to any other required information, provide a listing of locations within New York where consumers may return electronic waste as part of the manufacturer's electronic waste acceptance program. Further, those manufacturers providing computers, hard drives and other "covered electronic equipment" containing internal memory where personal or other confidential data can be stored, must provide consumers with instructions for destroying such data before they surrender the product for reuse or recycling.
The bulk of the Act, effective as of April 1, 2011, serves to impose various new mandates on “manufacturers” [ECL §27-2601(11)] and ”retailers” [ECL §27-2601(16)] geared toward increasingly stringent goals for recycling of “covered electronic equipment” (“CEE”) [ECL §27-2601(5)] , as well creation of associated systems for the collection and recycling/reuse of electronic waste at no cost from consumers under NYS Department of Environmental Conversation ("DEC") oversight. To this end ECL §27-2605 requires manufacturers to register with the DEC, at a one-time cost of $5,000, and supply detailed information on the sales and total weight of CEE sold by the manufacturer in New York.
Manufacturer Requirements:
The Act defines “manufacturers” broadly to include any person or entity that: "(a) assembles or substantially assembles covered electronic equipment for sale in the state; (b) manufactures covered electronic equipment under its own brand name or under any other brand name for sale in the state; (c) sells, under its own brand name, covered electronic equipment sold in the state; (d) owns a brand name that it licenses to another person for use on covered electronic equipment sold in the state; (e) imports covered electronic equipment for sale in the state; or (f) manufactures covered electronic equipment for sale in the state without affixing a brand name.” ECL §27-2601(11).
Excluded from the sweep of "manufacturer" are those persons and entities who sell “less than one thousand units of covered electronic equipment annually” in New York or “whose primary business is the sale of covered electronic equipment which is comprised primarily of rebuilt, refurbished or used components.”
The Act also imposes joint and several responsibility and liability on those that jointly manufacture a product qualifying as a CEE, noting “any such person may assume responsibility for obligations of a manufacturer of that brand under this title. If none of those persons assumes responsibility for the obligations of a manufacturer under this title, any and all such persons jointly and severally may be considered to be the responsible manufacturer of that brand for purposes of this title.” ECL §27-2601(11).
In addition, ECL §27-2605(5)(b) requires a manufacturer, as part of its required electronic waste acceptance program (“EWAP”), to provide “information on how consumers can destroy all data on any electronic waste, either through physical destruction of the hard drive or through data wiping,” while ECL §27-2605(5)(c) mandates as part of the EWAP a public education program to inform consumers about the manufacturer's electronic waste acceptance program, including at a minimum:
"an internet website and a toll-free telephone number and written information included in the product manual for, or at the time of sale of, covered electronic equipment that provides sufficient information to allow a consumer of covered electronic equipment to learn how to return the covered equipment for recycling or reuse, and in the case of manufacturers of computers, hard drives and other covered electronic equipment that have internal memory on which personal or other confidential data can be stored, such website shall provide instructions for how consumers can destroy such data before surrendering the products for recycling or reuse.”
The manufacturer's internet website must also, in addition to any other required information required above, provide a listing of locations within New York where consumers may return electronic waste as part of the manufacturer's EWAP.
Lastly, manufacturers must also maintain records on site to demonstrate compliance with the Act, and make them available upon request by the DEC for a period of three years. See www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/66845.html
For purposes of the Act, “personal or other confidential data” is not expressly defined in the otherwise very detailed definitions section. For example, the definition of “covered electronic equipment” under ECL §27-2601(5), includes a wide variety of equipment, notably all of the following:
- computers [as further defined at ECL §27-2601(2)];
- computer peripherals [as further defined at ECL §27-2601(3)];
- small electronic equipment [as further defined at ECL §27-2601(19)];
- small-scale servers [as further defined at ECL §27-2601(20)];
- cathode ray tubes [as further defined at ECL §27-2601(1)]; and
- televisions [as further defined at ECL §27-2601(21)].
The definition of "covered electronic equipment" expressly excludes a:
“motor vehicle or any part thereof; camera or video camera; portable or stationary radio; household appliances such as clothes washers, clothes dryers, refrigerators, freezers, microwave ovens, ovens, ranges or dishwashers; equipment that is functionally or physically part of a larger piece of equipment intended for use in an industrial, research and development or commercial setting; security or anti-terrorism equipment; monitoring and control instrument or system; thermostat; hand-held transceiver; telephone of any type; portable digital assistant or similar device; calculator; global positioning system (GPS) receiver or similar navigation device; a server other than a small-scale server; a cash register or retail self checkout system; a stand-alone storage product intended for use in industrial, research and development or commercial settings; commercial medical equipment that contains within it a cathode ray tube, a flat panel display or similar video display device, and is not separate from the larger piece of equipment; or other medical devices as that term is defined under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.”
Interestingly, as can be seen above, “telephone[s] of any type” and “portable digital assistant[s] or similar device[s]” are expressly exempted from the definition of CEE. As a result, the mandates of the Act do not apply to any PDAs, cellphones or smartphones, all of today generally can and do contain gigabytes of personal and potentially confidential data. Such devices are, however, otherwise within the scope of the New York State Wireless Recycling Act, effective January 1, 2007, which specifies that all wireless telephone service providers offering cell phones for sale in New York are required to accept at no charge to consumers cell phones for reuse or recycling.
Retailer Requirements:
A different section of the Act, ECL §26-2607, imposes new requirements on "retailers," as defined under ECL §26-2601(16). As of April 1, 2011, retailers of CEE must “at the location of sale” provide buyers of CEE information “about opportunities for the return of electronic waste that has been provided to the retailer by a manufacturer.” ECL §26-2607(1).
All New York “retailers” are flat-out banned by this new section 26-2607 from the sale or offer for sale in New York of any CEE unless the “the manufacturer and the manufacturer's brands are registered with the NY Department of Environmental Conservation” as specified in ECL §27-2605. This is a significant and burdensome requirement on retailers, who have no ability to force manufacturers to conform with the mandates of the new Title 26 of Article 27, other than as may be specified in the parties' supply contracts or purchase order terms and conditions.
In partial recognition of the onerous results that may befall retailers due to this section, sub-section (2) provides a safe harbor of sorts where any CEE purchased by a retailer from a manufacturer who “fails to register by [] [Jan. 1, 2011], or prior to the date the manufacturer withdrew its registration or the registration was revoked by the department” may continue to be sold until 180 days after April 1, 2011 or 180 days from date the manufacturer's registration was withdrawn or revoked. Continued sales of CEE, that may not otherwise be offered for sale in New York pursuant to this section, to retailers or others outside of New York are arguably not effected, as such a blanket ban applied to non-New York parties in interstate commerce could potentially implicate dormant commerce clause issues beyond the scope of this posting.
Penalties:
According to the DEC, the Act “except to the extent otherwise required by law” immunizes manufacturers and the owners/operators of any electronic waste collection site, electronic waste consolidation facility or electronic waste recycling facility from “any responsibility or liability for any data in any form stored on electronic waste surrendered for recycling or reuse, unless such person misuses or knowingly and intentionally, or with gross negligence, discloses the data.” http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/66845.html
Manufacturers: However, manufacturers that fail to comply with the data security notification requirements in the Act may receive a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for a first violation; up to $2,500 for a second violation; and up to $5,000 for the third and any following violations within a 12-month period. §71-2729(1)(c)(ii). Manufacturers are also potentially subject to a separate fine of $1,000 per day for any failures to submit required reports, registrations, fees or surcharges. §71-2729(1)(c)(i).
Retailers: Retailers that violate the Act may be fined up to $250 for a first offense; $500 for a second offense; and up to $1,000 for a third and any additional offense within a 12-month period. §71-2729(1)(d).
Owners/operators of a electronic waste collection site, electronic waste consolidation facility or electronic waste recycling facility are liable to $250 fines for each offense of the Act, with no maximum aggregate fine. §71-2729(1)(b).
Finally, consumers who violate the provisions of the Act are subject to a civil penalty up to $100 maximum for each violation. §71-2729(1)(a).
FAQ on the "BEST PRACTICES Act" - Part One
Congressman Bobby Rush has introduced a new data privacy bill to Congress known as the “Building Effective Strategies to Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards" Act (a.k.a. “BEST PRACTICES Act” or “Act”). Congressman Rush has been active in the data security/privacy legislation space. In December of 2009, his “Data Accountability and Trust Act” or (“DATA Act”) passed the House of Representatives. While DATA focused more on data security and breach notice, the stated focus of the BEST PRACTICES Act is as follows:
To foster transparency about the transparency about the commercial use of personal
information, provide consumers with meaningful choice about the collection, use, and disclosure of such information, and for other purposes.
This Act comes on the heels of the Boucher Bill, which also represents a comprehensive data privacy approach (for more information on the reactions to the Boucher Bill you can look here and here).
We have put together a summary of the Act in “FAQ” format. In Part One we look at some of the key definitions, requirements concerning transparency, notice and individual choice, mandates around accuracy, access and dispute resolution, and finally data security and data minimization requirements under the Act. Part Two focuses on the “Safe Harbor” outlined in the Act, various exemptions for deidentified information, and provisions concerning the application and enforcement of the Act. Final note, this is not a law, but rather only a bill -- if passed at all, it is likely that the final version will vary from this initial proposal.
What kinds of entities does the Act apply to?
The Act defines “covered entities” to mean any person engaged in interstate commerce that collects or stores data containing covered information or sensitive information. However, section 601 of the Act limits the application of the Act to only those persons over which the Commission has authority pursuant to section 5(a)(2) of the FTC Act (Note: this section previously indicated that the Act applied to all persons engaged in interstate commerce [which is in the definition of covered entity]; the error was noted by a reader and the correction made here). Covered entities do not include any divisions of Federal or state government or some entities that meet specified criteria (e.g. store less than 15,000 records; collect less than 12,000 records in a year, etc.; see definition of “covered entity” for more detail).
Observations: Significantly, it does not appear that the definition of covered entity makes the traditional distinction between data owner/controller and service provider/processor. As such, service providers may be directly subject to the Act as a result of collection or storage of covered/sensitive information on behalf of their customers.
What kinds of information does the Act regulate?
The Act regulates “covered information” and “sensitive information.”
“Covered information” includes such information elements as first name or initial and last name, postal address, email address, telephone/fax number, government issued identification numbers (e.g. tax ID, driver’s license number, etc.), financial account numbers, credit/debit card number, access codes/passwords, “unique persistent identifiers” used to collect, store or identify information about a specific individual or create a profile (e.g. customer numbers, IP addresses, unique pseudonym), and any information collected, stored, used or disclosed in connection with the foregoing information. Section (B) of the definition also lists a number of important exclusions concerning certain business-related information.
“Sensitive information” means information associated with covered information of an individual that relates directly to the individual’s medical history or health, race or ethnicity, religious beliefs/affiliations, sexual orientation/behavior, financial information (income, assets, liabilities, etc.), a person’s geolocation information, unique biometric information or social security number.
Observations: The definitions of information regulated under the Act go well beyond any U.S. definition of personally identifiable information. For example, the “traditional” definition of PII normally requires first name and last name combined with additional information such as financial account numbers. The definition of “covered information” in the Act does not require such a combination – each data element stands on its own and may not need to be tied to or identify a specific person. If I, as an individual, had an email address that was wildwolf432@hotmail.com, that would would appear to satisfy the definition of covered information even if my name was not associated with it.
The definition of “sensitive information” echos similar definitions under the EU Data Protection Directive and other laws based on an EU Model. Interestingly, however, it also specifically includes geolocation information (which some believe may become a larger privacy issue with the prevalence of mobile computing and smartphones).
How does the Act promote transparency about the commercial use of information?
Section 101 of the Act purports to promote transparency by requiring covered entities to provide certain information about the covered entity’s information practices and the individual’s options with respect to such practices, including:
- the identity of the covered entity
- description of covered/sensitive information collected or stored by covered entity
- the specific purposes for which the covered entity collects and used the covered information, including how the covered entity customizes products/services/prices based on such information
- the specific purposes for which covered/sensitive information may be disclosed to third parties and the categories of third parties who may receive such information the choice and means for limiting the collection, use and disclosure of covered/sensitive information
- a description of the information any individual may request access to and the means for making such a request
- how the covered entity may merge, link or combine covered/sensitive information
- the retention schedule for covered/sensitive information including whether the entity will retain information permanently
- whether the individual can direct the deletion of information collected from or about the individual
- a reasonable means for individuals to contact the covered entities regarding their handing of covered/sensitive information
- the process by which the covered entity notifies individuals of material changes to its practices or policies
- a hyperlink to the FTC Commissioner’s online consumer complaint form or the FTC’s toll-free number for the Commissions Consumer Response Center
- the effective date of the privacy notice.
Observations: While much of the notice requirements of the Act parallel the Fair Information Privacy Principles, one could argue that the Act also includes notice elements that appear to go beyond such principles. These additional elements also appear to address current issues that some believe may pose privacy problems. For example, it is interesting that notice is required concerning where/how information will be merged or combined with other data. The retention schedule requirement is also interesting as it may address concerns that some have about some companies retaining data too long.
How must the notice required under the Act be provided?
Under section 102 of the Act, the notices described in the prior FAQ must be “concise, meaningful, timely, prominent, and easy-to-understand” in accordance with FTC regulations authorized under the Act that will be published later. Notices must be retained for six years from the later of the date the notice was issued or the date it was last in effect.
Is notice required for “in-person transactions”?
Under section 103 of the Act, it appears that the notice and information referenced above is not necessary for “in-person transactions” but only if the covered information is collected for an “operational purpose” (e.g.for the purpose of providing goods or services, managing operations, compliance with legal obligations or protection against risks and threats ) or if the covered entity is only collecting name, address, email or phone/fax and does not share the information or use that information to acquire additional information about the individual from third parties.
Observations: Notably, the Act does not indicate that covered information needs to be collected solely for operational purposes. Based on the current wording, one could argue that if covered information was covered for both operational purposes and marketing purposes, it could fall under the “operational purposes” exception.
Are covered entities required to get consent from individuals for the collection and use of covered information?
Yes, under section 103 of the Act covered entities must provide “opt-out” consent in order to collect or use covered information (except for the collection or use of covered information for operational purposes). The Act indicates that a covered entity shall be considered to have obtained proper consent if it has provided the notice required under the Act, provides a reasonable means to exercise an opt-out right and decline consent; and the individual either affirmatively grants consent or does not decline consent.
The consent shall be considered permanent unless directed by the individual. However, the covered entity must provide an individual with a reasonable means to decline or revoke previously granted consent at any time.
A covered entity may also provide individuals with the ability to decline consent for specific uses of his or her personal information, but only if the individual has been given an opportunity to broadly opt-out of all collection and use of covered information.
May covered entities collection or use covered information as a condition of an individual’s receipt of a service or other benefit?
Yes, but only if: the covered entity has a direct relationship with the individual; the information is not shared with any third party without the express affirmative consent of the individual; the covered entity provides a clear, prominent and specific statement of the specific purposes for which covered information will be used; the individual provides consent by acknowledging such uses; and the individual is able to later withdraw consent.
Are covered entities required to get consent from individuals for the disclosure of covered information to third parties?
Yes. In general, a covered entity may not disclose information to a third party unless it has received express affirmative consent from the individual prior to disclosure. However, some exceptions apply. For example, no such consent is necessary for joint marketing activities as long as the covered entity has entered into a contract with the third party that prohibits the disclosure of the information except as necessary to carry out the joint marketing relationship.
Are covered entities required to get consent from individuals for the collection, use or disclosure of sensitive information?
Yes. In general, under section 104 of the Act, a covered entity may not collect, use or disclose sensitive information to a third party unless it has received express affirmative consent from the individual.
Does the Act put any limitations or restrictions on behavioral advertising or tracking an individual’s Internet browsing activities?
Yes. Under section 104 of the Act, covered entities may not use software or hardware to monitor all or substantially all (a.k.a. “comprehensive online data collection”) of an individual’s browsing activity (or other significant Internet or computer activity), and may not collect, use or disclose information concerning that activity unless certain conditions are met.
Covered entities may engage in comprehensive online data collection if: they receive the express written consent of the individual or for the purpose of making such information accessible to the individual for the use by the individual.
Are there any exceptions to the consent requirements of the Act?
Yes, exceptions exist under section 106 of the Act.
Covered entities may disclose information to a service provider as long as it has obtained the initial consent to collect information and contractually prohibits the service provider from disclosing the information other than for purposes of carrying out the purpose for which the information was disclosed. However, the Act indicates that the covered entity remains responsible and liable for the protection of the information transferred to a service provider for processing.
Consent is also not required for collection, use or disclosure necessary for fraud detection, imminent danger or compliance with law.
In addition, consent under the Act is not necessary for the collection, use or disclosure of publicly available information. However, even publicly available information cannot be used by a covered entity for marketing purposes if the individual has opted out of such use.
Do covered entities have any obligation concerning the accuracy of information they collect, assemble or maintain?
Yes, section 201 of the Act requires covered entities to establish reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of covered information or sensitive information they collect, assemble or maintain. This duty may be further fleshed out as section 201 requires the FTC to promulgate regulations to implement this section. Limited exceptions exist with respect to fraud databases and publicly available information.
Does the Act require the covered entity to provide individuals with access to covered information or sensitive information?
Yes, under section 202, covered entities are required to provide access to such information if such information may be used for purposes that could result in an adverse decision against the individual, including the denial of a right, benefit, or privilege. If the information could not reasonably result in an adverse decision, the covered entity is only required to provide a notice to the individual of the type of information the covered entity typically collects.
In addition, covered entities, upon request, must provide individuals with access to their personal files, but only if the entity stores such file in a manner that makes it accessible in the normal course of business.
However, none of the foregoing obligations apply to information retained for under 30 days.
Is there any time frame by which a covered entity must respond to a permitted access, correction or amendment request?
Yes, in general, under section 202(f), covered entities have thirty days from the receipt of such request to respond.
Does the Act impose any data security requirements with respect to covered information or sensitive information?
Yes, under section 302 of the Act each covered entity and service provider must establish, implement and maintain “reasonable and appropriate” administrative, technical and physical safeguards to:
- ensure the security, integrity, and confidentiality of the covered information or sensitive information it collects, assembles, or maintains
- protect against any anticipated threats, reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities, or hazards to the security or integrity of such information; and
- protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information and loss, misuse, alteration, or destruction of such information.
The Act requires the FTC to promulgate regulations to implement this section.
Does the Act require covered entities to conduct any risk assessment with respect to its information handling practices?
Yes, under section 302 of the Act covered entities are required to conduct an assessment of the risks to individuals raised by its collection, use and disclosure of covered information or sensitive information prior to engaging in such activities (or if it believes there is a reasonable likelihood that it will engage in such activities), but only if such activities will involve more than 1 million individuals.
Does the Act require any audits or assessments?
Yes, covered entities must conduct periodic assessments to evaluate whether the covered/sensitive information it has collected remains necessary for the purposes described at the time of collection, and whether the covered entities’ ongoing collection practices remain necessary for legitimate business purposes.
Does the Act limit how long a covered entity can retain covered/sensitive information?
Yes, under section 303 of the Act covered entities may retain covered/sensitive information for only as long as necessary to fulfill a legitimate business purpose or comply with a legal requirement.
Coming up next in Part Two: the “Safe Harbor” outlined in the Act, various exemptions for de-identified information and application and enforcement of the Act.
Insurers Deny Coverage for Breach Notice Costs (and why companies should consider cyber insurance coverage and why brokers should offer it)
It was recently reported that an insurance carrier (Colorado Casualty Insurance Co.) denied coverage (and filed a lawsuit) for the $3.3 million in costs the University of Utah incurred to provide notice of a security breach involving the records of 1.7 million patients from the University’s hospitals. You can find a copy of Colorado Casualty's declaratory judgment action complaint here. The University also filed its own counter claim, cross-claim and third party claim. As discussed further below, the University's cross-claim is against Perpetual Storage (the service provider that allegedly lost the data) and its third party claim is against Perpetual Storage’s insurance broker (the broker that placed the insurance coverage with Colorado Casualty).
The parenthetical in the title of this blogpost may seem counter-intuitive perhaps, but it appears that this controversy and the pleadings that have been filed paint a picture of what can potentially go wrong when proper cyber or technology errors and omissions coverage is not in place. It will be interesting to see how this case shakes out (and I make no predictions on what will happen because I lack too much information to analyze the issue), but I guarantee that the players involved are probably wishing they purchased explicit cyber or technology errors and omissions coverage (again, it appears that they may not have, but I don’t have all the information to state that definitively). Instead, they will have to litigate with no guarantees of success (and large hurdles for the University). Ironically, the University may ultimately recover from insurance proceeds, but those proceeds may come from the insurer that provides errors and omissions coverage to Perpetual Storage's insurance broker.**
Background
The following background allegations were taken from the original compliant and the University’s complaint.
It appears that Perpetual Storage contracted with the University to provide data storage services. In June 2008, back-up tapes containing personal information of 1.7 million patients were stolen from a Perpetual Storage employee’s car. 1.1 million of the records included social security numbers. This employee allegedly parked his car while working at a second job, and later in his driveway at home overnight. The tapes were allegedly taken in the middle of the night approximately 8 to 12 hours after they had been picked up.
In response to this incident, as of May 25, 2010 the University had incurred about $3.35 million in costs broken down as follows: $2,483,057 related to credit monitoring expenses (one year for each impacted individual whose social security number had been exposed); $646,149 related to printing and mailing costs for notice to each of the 1.7 million impacted individuals; $81,389 related to phone bank costs (to field more than 11,000 phone calls); and an additional $144,158 in miscellaneous costs. In addition, the University allegedly expended 6,232 personnel hours responding to and mitigating the security breach (and it seeks compensation for that lost time as well).
Colorado Casualty appears to have issued two insurance policies to Perpetual Storage, one described as a “commercial package policy” and the other a “commercial liability umbrella policy.” None of the pleadings mention Perpetual Storage or the University having purchased cyber coverage (i.e. data security or privacy coverage) or errors or omissions coverage.
Procedurally, there is a fair amount going on with this case, including a motion to dismiss by Perpetual Motion. Most relevant, however is the University’s activity. It filed an answer and several claims against various players. First, it filed against Colorado Casualty and attempts to assert that coverage is available. It also filed against Perpetual Storage directly for its acts and errors, including allegations that Perpetual breached its contract with the University. Finally, it filed a claim against Perpetual Storage’s insurance broker, United Insurance Services, alleging that United failed to procure the insurance coverage needed by Perpetual.
Observations
This case is interesting for many reasons, some of them outlined below.
Do not rely on a commercial general liability policy or traditional property policy to get coverage for security or privacy breaches.
From experience, unless an endorsement was purchased, it would be unusual for a general commercial liability policy to provide first party coverage for breach notice costs (mailings, call center, credit monitoring) or professional liability coverage (coverage for liability due to an act, error or omission of a professional service provider like Perpetual). In fact, there are several cases that have found that commercial general liability policies and property policies do not cover certain data security and privacy risks. Of course, there may be arguments in favor of coverage under certain general commercial policies or property policies, but it may not be clear cut and it may require expensive litigation to obtain that coverage. It is also possible that these policies had endorsements providing more than the traditional coverage (and ultimately the specific wording is what will matter; for purposes of this blogpost I am assuming that the language is fairly similar to traditional policies I have worked with).
The moral of this story is that there is insurance out there, provided by many carriers (and more and more are providing it) that is specifically intended to provide coverage for information security and privacy breaches and technology professional liability. This insurance is specifically designed to provide coverage for damages and defense costs arising out of a data security breach or an act, error or omission in the rendering of professional technology services (like data storage services). Moreover, coverage now exists for direct costs incurred by an insured to provide notice to individuals in the event of a security breach, as well as expenses to set up a call center and provide credit monitoring. Having purchased coverage for this specific purpose, companies can have a much much higher level of certainty that the type of data breach described in this case will be covered.
Insure your own company directly.
The University in this case does not appear to have its own cyber insurance coverage (if they did, I am assuming they would have tendered their expenses to their own carrier and this controversy would most likely not exist). Instead they are making the difficult argument that they should be the beneficiaries of insurance purchased by their service provider. All of this could have been avoided if the University had purchased a cyber policy directly insuring the University.
Most cyber insurance companies provide coverage for “breach notice costs,” including mailing costs, credit monitoring and call center expenses. In addition, most cyber policies provide coverage if the security breach happens to one of the insured’s service providers. That coverage would have addressed the vast majority of the expenses incurred by the University (most cyber policies, however, probably would not provide any coverage for the personnel hours expended internally to address the breach). The moral of this story is if you are an organization that handles a lot of personal information (or other sensitive information), regardless of how secure you think you are (and by now everybody knows that there is no such thing as perfect security; breaches are a matter of when and how bad at this point), you should seriously consider cyber insurance in your risk management mix.
Brokers beware.
It looks as if the University is exercising all its options to try to get reimbursed for the expenses it incurred to address this security breach – it even sued Perpetual Storage’s insurance broker. However, considering there is no direct contract between the University and that broker it may be difficult to recover. Rather, Perpetual Storage is likely in a better position to sue its own broker for breach of contract and/or negligence.
Nonetheless, there is also a moral here for brokers. Here is the reality in 2010: most companies of all shapes, sizes and wealth profiles use information technology and handle sensitive information including personal information and credit card numbers. That means they face potential direct losses due to a data breach (the biggest risk being having to provide notice under breach notice laws and provide credit monitoring/call centers). It also means that most organizations face potential lawsuits and liability arising out of data security and privacy breaches (e.g. consumer lawsuits, employee lawsuits, lawsuits by banks if credit cards are lost, and regulatory actions).
As such, brokers should be aware of the data security and privacy risk their clients face, understand where and how that risk might be covered. Where appropriate brokers should approach the market to obtain cyber insurance for their customers. Unfortunately, cyber policies (due to their technological nature) are often very complex and brokers dealing with general liability insurance may not have the training or expertise to understand where cyber insurance fits in and how it provides coverage. This problem needs to be overcome or we will see a lot more lawsuits against brokers after security breaches.
Last point to make, assuming the University does not have its own policy, I am wondering whether (or when) the University decides to name its own insurance broker as a defendant. I suppose it will depend on whether that broker raised the issue of cyber insurance, and whether the University turned it down or was unable to obtain coverage.
Conclusion
The bottom line is that practically every company in our modern economy has information security and privacy risk. There is no way to completely eliminate it (and it is not cost-effective in most cases to even try). That leaves residual risk that can either be internalized (like the University did) or transferred. Companies that want to transfer that risk would be well-served to get piece of mind and relative predictability by purchasing a cyber policy actually designed to address the risk. Relying on a general liability or property policy to provide the coverage is no longer a wise choice (if it ever was). Of course this does not mean that cyber insurance is the proper decision for every company, cost is always a factor. Nonetheless, with dozens of carriers now offering the coverage on some level competition is fierce both on price and coverage scope, so now is the right time to explore the market.
Final note, many of my observations and much of my analysis above is based on assumptions I am making concerning the nature of the policy and the facts of this case. Depending on what is in that policy, and what really happened in this matter, some of my predictions could be off or not applicable. If the policies are filed in court, we will revisit this matter and dig a little deeper.
**DISCLOSURE: I have several cyber insurance company clients and have assisted with drafting some of the top-selling forms in the marketplace; independent of those relationships, however, I am a huge proponent of risk transfer when it comes to security, privacy and technology risk, and believe that no data security and privacy risk management process is complete without considering cyber insurance.
Information Governance
When it comes to creating policies for handling personal data in an organization, who decides? How are those policy decisions made and kept up to date?
These are questions of governance – I would call it “information governance.” Most large enterprises have established responsibilities and procedures for information technology governance and specifically for IT security policies, procedures, procurement, management, and training. In many cases, however, these have not been fully mapped to personal data compliance and risk management requirements, which should be defined and monitored by a somewhat different group of people, from departments beyond IT and security. Unless privacy issues are visible in the internal governance process, the organization – and the individuals that deal with it -- may be exposed to some nasty surprises.
One consequence of the growing body of laws, regulations, standards, and contractual requirements dealing with protected categories of personally identifiable information (PII) is a heightened awareness of the importance of establishing effective internal governance mechanisms. The organization needs to be clear on who decides, and how, key questions such as these:
• Which kinds of PII should be collected in the first place?
• Which categories of PII require particular safeguards or treatment, either legally or because the information is considered especially sensitive by customers and employees, or by the organization itself?
• How should PII be secured?
• Who should be given access to PII, and for what purposes?
• How are individuals informed of events (such as business changes and security breaches) and options (such as op-in or opt-out choices) that affect their privacy and personal security?
• How should PII be disposed of at the end of its useful life?
In some cases, legislators, regulators, and industry standards bodies provide guidance on PII management and governance, at least by implication. But for the most part, organizations must find their own way to weave privacy compliance and PII risk management into effective internal governance procedures. Adding privacy to the organization’s governance structure, with constant reference to evolving privacy rules and standards, is one way to avoid costly mistakes and arm the organization with legal defenses in the event of a security breach or a serious privacy complaint.
I recently presented a workshop on “information governance” at the Vanguard Security 2010 conference in Las Vegas. Some of the participants, typically managers of enterprise IT security functions, were concerned about whether their employers -- companies, universities, healthcare systems, and government agencies -- were organizationally equipped to make appropriate decisions about collecting, securing, and using PII in a rapidly changing legal and regulatory environment.
It’s a legitimate concern. Organizations in both the private and public sectors are increasingly held accountable for the proper handling of sensitive or potentially dangerous PII such as health records, Social Security Numbers, bank account and payment card details, credit reports, and background checks. An effective system of both privacy and security governance is essential if the organization is to achieve substantial compliance, manage litigation and market risks, and respond adequately to privacy challenges and to security threats and incidents. Relevant laws, standards, and contract requirements sometimes mandate certain aspects of privacy or security management and, less frequently, governance. Otherwise, it is ultimately a matter of finding what best fits your organization’s leadership culture – although it may be helpful to compare models from other organizations with similar needs.
What PII Do You Handle?
Don Harris of HR Privacy Solutions often refers to personal data as the latest “controlled substance.” For purposes of this discussion, I use the term “PII” to mean whatever personally identifiable information your organization has an obligation to protect from unauthorized disclosure, use, loss, or alteration. In the US, that varies considerably by sector and jurisdiction. US state laws requiring personal information security measures or notification of security breaches (in all but four states) typically apply only to limited categories of PII that raise the greatest risk of identity theft, such as the SSN, driver’s license number, and bank account or payment card number (combined with a PIN or other access code). The US federal HIPAA and HITECH acts and a number of state laws more broadly regulate health records, while the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and financial supervisory authorities focus on the confidentiality of financial records. The Fair Credit Reporting Act is concerned with consumer reports. Equal Employment Opportunity laws often address the proper collection and use of information about race, ethnicity, religion, age, gender, disability, family status, or sexual life. Other laws protect information about students and their parents, licensed drivers, telephone and cable subscribers, persons renting DVDs and videotapes, library patrons, clients of mental health and substance abuse programs, people who seek refuge in battered women’s shelters, genetic data, and an array of other categories of PII deemed potentially risky to individuals. Meanwhile, an organization may be required contractually to handle certain kinds of data in a prescribed manner, such as the PCI-DSS standards that apply to the processing of credit and debit card payments.
By contrast, PII can be almost any information relating to an identifiable individual under the more comprehensive privacy and data protection laws in Canada, the European Union, Australia, Japan, and several other jurisdictions. Even in those jurisdictions, however, there is often an enhanced obligation to protect especially sensitive categories of PII such as those relating to race or ethnicity, health and sex life, religion, political opinion, trade union involvement, criminal records, consumer profiles, bankruptcy, personal financial records, genetic data, geolocation data (such as tracking a person’s physical location through his mobile phone or RFID security badge), and official identifiers such as passports and national ID numbers that could be used in fraud and identity theft.
Who Is Responsible?
Within the organization, who accepts responsibility for ensuring that all relevant categories of PII are handled appropriately? In some organizations, the Chief Legal Officer, Chief Information Officer, or Chief Technology Officer is considered primarily responsible for PII policy decisions. In others, the decisions may be made by senior executives responsible for human relations (employee data) or customer relations (consumer data). Obviously, policy decisions should be made in consultation with the legal or compliance functions in the organization. IT security managers will provide some of the tools and techniques – once they know what the requirements are and how to classify the data. HR management should be on top of employee privacy issues in all the jurisdictions in which the organization has employees (and their dependents) or independent contractors and temporary workers. The customer relations and marketing managers should understand the restrictions under which they operate and the disclosures and choices they must provide. Records management should implement appropriate storage and disposal policies. And many organizations now have a “privacy officer” (under any of a variety of titles) who is charged with offering guidance and making recommendations relating to PII.
Business managers also typically make recommendations, but their primary job is to see that the organization’s policies are implemented – that is the management function. Security and privacy governance refers to the process by which those policies are adopted in the first place and then monitored and adjusted. Ultimately, policy decisions should be made by senior or C-level executives or (for the most fundamental policies) by the board of directors or agency chief. Ideally, the CEO and directors are at least broadly aware of privacy and security issues affecting the organization’s handling of PII -- well before the first embarrassing privacy complaint or security breach hits the news.
Governance Requirements and Tools
Most PII laws and regulations are not terribly detailed in referring to information governance issues. It is simply the organization’s obligation to find the best ways to achieve compliance.
Corporate governance, particularly in publicly traded companies, offers some familiar and relevant models for information governance. In the US (especially under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or “SOX”), Canada, Europe, and Japan, financial reporting laws or stock exchange rules require management controls in all areas material to the accurate reporting of financial results to investors and regulators. Under those laws, a CFO, CEO, or Audit Committee of the board must certify the effectiveness of the company’s control procedures. In most modern companies, IT is used for data collection and reporting and, indeed, is critical to the success of the organization. Thus, internal and external auditors refer to IT management “control objectives,” often with reference to the COBIT Framework published by ISACA.
IT control objectives may include items such as access controls, encryption, and data retention policies as required to comply with PII rules or to manage PII risks. In some companies, there is such a dependence on protected PII that management reporting expressly refers to relevant PII compliance requirements such as those imposed by HIPAA, GLBA, FRCA, PCI-DSS, PIPEDA, or national laws based on the EU Data Protection Directive. In those cases, PII compliance requirements are documented in specific control objectives with associated policies and procedures, assigned to responsible functions, and periodically audited and certified.
Apart from public company governance requirements, some laws and regulations specifically require that there is a designated person or department accountable for the security of covered PII, with an obligation to report to senior management. This is true of US federal health and financial privacy regulation, as it is of Canadian legislation incorporating the CSA’s Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information. In several EU countries and Switzerland, the organization may or must designate an internal data protection officer who reviews and maintains a “registry” of PII processing in the organization, renders a written opinion on proposals for handling sensitive categories of data, and reports directly to the highest level of management.
Increasingly, laws and regulations governing PII mandate a risk-based, written security policy. In the US, the HIPAA and GLBA privacy and security rules require written policies, as do the “Red Flag Rules” adopted by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal financial regulatory bodies to combat identity theft. The Massachusetts Personal Information Security Regulation requires a written information security policy (commonly called a “WISP”) covering the categories of data for which security breach notices are required. The Canadian CSA standard and several European countries similarly require or recommend written security policies, documented procedures, and approvals by the governing body of a company or agency.
E-government laws and executive policies in the US and Canada require agencies to designate a privacy officer, reporting to a senior agency executive, with oversight by an auditor or inspector general from outside the agency (or by the federal or provincial privacy commissioner, in Canada). US and Canadian federal agencies are also now generally required to prepare a privacy impact assessment (PIA), identifying PII needs and measures to mitigate privacy risks, before implementing a new or substantially modified information system that includes PII.
Some companies and nonprofits in North America and Europe follow a similar approach of requiring the responsible manager to prepare a PIA for review by a privacy officer and, if there are serious objections, by executive management. Some also undertake a baseline privacy audit to determine where the organization is already handling PII and where it might be at risk. Periodic security audits are common in many organizations, but the scope often needs to be adjusted to include protected categories of PII.
A variety of vendors offer “GRC” (governance, risk, and compliance) software tools and databases to help automate the task of identifying PII in the organization’s information systems and checklisting PII compliance requirements and actions. These can be helpful, although there is inevitably a need for knowledgable individuals to review the scope, methodology, and results.
As much PII processing is ultimately outsourced, and PII is often exchanged with business partners, a key aspect of compliance is contract management. HIPAA and GLBA, the Canadian CSA standards incorporated in PIPEDA and provincial laws, and the EU Data Protection Directive all require a measure of due diligence in contracting with vendors to handle PII. Contracts that refer to the confidentiality of proprietary information should also address the confidentiality and security of PII. The procurement function in the organization needs to be made aware of PII risks and requirements, and procurement and legal personnel should ensure that there are appropriate confidentiality and indemnification clauses, security schedules, and any required provisions to meet sectoral requirements or legal conditions for cross-border transfers of PII (e.g., from the EU to the US or India). In some cases, it is practical and appropriate to make contractual reference to established information security management and control standards such as ISO 27001 / 27002, PCI-DSS, or NIST 800 series guidelines. An aspect of information governance is setting policies for such contract requirements and monitoring procurement practices that involve PII, since accountability itself can rarely be outsourced.
Trends and Keys
The privacy and data protection laws and PII security and breach notification legislation have motivated organizations to better understand changing legal requirements, to inventory their collection, use, and sharing of PII, and to minimize the use or retention of sensitive PII throughout the organization. In some companies that means, for example, reducing the instances where SSNs and other official identifiers are recorded or communicated, encrypting PII, outsourcing payment card verification, and imposing stricter data destruction schedules on customer and employee records.
Organizations have also been driven to establish or update written policies and procedures for handling PII, and then include these in training and internal audits, as well as in contracts with third parties.
Another trend has been to raise information governance to a more centralized and higher level of management and reporting, with privacy officers and IT security managers reporting to senior executives rather than to middle managers. This is an understandable result of high-profile privacy and security lapses affecting the organization or its peers, as well as of SOX, security breach notice laws, FTC and state investigations, and pressure from privacy commissioners and sectoral regulators.
From our observation, and from reports by professional associations and conference participants, it appears that two elements are key to the success of organizations that have established effective information governance relating to PII: a high-level champion that the CEO, board, and business managers will listen to, and a liaison team to review PII issues and make recommendations to management. Depending on the structure and mission of the organization, the privacy liaison team might include representatives of several functions that deal with PII: IT, security, HR, customer relations, marketing, government relations, labor relations, legal, compliance, audit, procurement or contract management, product development, international subsidiaries (subject to different PII rules). It is not hard to imagine who should have a seat at the table (or more likely on the email list and occasional conference call), but it may be a challenge to identify who will convene and lead the team, unless the organization has already designated a chief privacy officer or equivalent position.
In the end, good information governance depends not only on procedures and tools but on the quality, drive, and authority of those who lead the effort.
FAQ on Washington State's PCI Law
On March 22, 2010, Washington state became the third state to incorporate the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard ("PCI") into law (the other two are Nevada and Minnesota). The Washington House and Senate have passed HB 1149 by substantial margins, and it has now been signed into law by the governor. HB 1149 amends Washington’s breach notice law (and borrows some of its definitions). Similar to Minnesota’s Plastic Card Security Act, HB 1149 provides issuing banks a legal mechanism to collect the costs to reissue payment cards after a payment card security breach. This blogpost summarizes HB 1149 in "FAQ" format and looks at its potential impact.
What is the overall stated purpose of HB 1149?
The introduction paragraph frames the purpose of the law in terms of protection consumers from identity theft due and fraud to data breaches of credit card data. To achieve this lofty goal, the law provides issuing banks the ability to seek reimbursement of reissuance costs in the wake of payment card data security breach. By providing this remedy, the drafters of the bill hope to encourage issuing banks to reissue cards, thereby reducing the incidence of identity theft and associated costs to consumers.
What organizations does HB 1149 apply to?
Moving past the introduction, the law provides a series of definitions related to payment card processing and data breaches. The law applies to “business(es),” “processors” and “vendors” (herein referred to as “Regulated Entities”). Businesses essentially refer to merchants that process more than six million payment cards annually, and who provide, offer or sell goods or services to residents of Washington. Processors are companies that process or transmit “account information” on behalf of another. Vendors are entities that manufacture and sell software or equipment designed to process, transmit or store account information that the vendor does not own.
Analysis: For each of these categories it is not necessary for the organization to physically reside in Washington state. To qualify as a “business “ the organization must merely offer or sell goods or services to Washington residents. Companies with an Internet website would arguably fall into that category. The definitions of “processor” or “vendor” do not even mention Washington residency as a limitation. As such, HB 1149 is likely to have reach beyond the borders of Washington State.
What kind of information does HB 1149 regulate?
HB 1149 imposes certain obligations with respect to “account information,” which is defined as follows:
Account information" means: (i) The full, unencrypted 2 magnetic stripe of a credit card or debit card; (ii) the full, unencrypted account information contained on an identification device as defined under RCW 19.300.010; or (iii) the unencrypted primary account number on a credit card or debit card or identification device, plus any of the following if not encrypted: Cardholder name, expiration date, or service code.
Analysis: Subsections (i) and (iii) mainly deal with various unencrypted cardholder data. Subsection (ii) however refers to unencrypted account information on “identification devices”, defined as "an item that uses radio frequency identification technology or facial recognition technology". An example might include a RFID tag. Identification devices are not obviously related to PCI and do not quite seem to fit into the overall theme of the law..
What data security obligations does HB 1149 impose on Regulated Entities?
Technically HB 1149 does not impose any obligations on Regulated Entities. Rather, the law works as a mechanism to transfer risk of loss between Regulated Entities and issuing banks in the event of a payment card breach involving Washington residents. Think of it as "sword and shield law": it gives issuing banks a sword to collect reissuance costs they otherwise might not be able to collect and provides companies a shield to avoid liability for such costs.
Section 2., paragraph (3)(a) indicates that if a processor or business fails to take reasonable care to guard against unauthorized access to account information, and that failure is the proximate cause of a breach, then the processor can be liable to issuing banks for costs to reissuing impacted payment cards. Section 2., paragraph (b) indicates that Vendors can be liable for damages caused by their negligence, but only if the claim is not limited or foreclosed by another provision of law or by contract to which the financial institution is party. However, as discussed further below, organizations that fall into HB 1149’s “safe harbor” will not be liable for reissuance costs (even if they did fail to take reasonable care or acted negligently).
Analysis: While there is no explicit/positive requirement for organizations to take reasonable care, companies that fail to do so may be liable to pay for reissuance costs after a breach. Contrast this against Nevada’s PCI law which imposed an affirmative obligation to be compliant with PCI for companies that accept payment cards.
What constitutes a “breach” under HB 1149?
HB 1149 borrows the definition for breach from Washington state’s breach notice law. As such breach has the same definition as “breach of the security of the system,” which is defined as follows:
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the person or business. Good faith acquisition of personal information by an employee or agent of the person or business for the purposes of the person or business is not a breach of the security of the system when the personal information is not used or subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
As you can see this definition references the term “personal information,” which is also a defined term under Washington’s breach notice law. Without repeating the entire definition, for information to be considered “personal information” it must include the first name/first initial and last name in combination with other data such as social security number or Washington driver’s license number. In addition, personal information includes first name/first initial and last name in combination with “account number or credit or debit card number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's financial account.”
Analysis. There may be a lack of consistency between the definition of “account information” and “personal information” such that it may be possible to have a compromise of “account information” without there being any "personal information" compromised. If that were the case then there would be no “breach” under HB 1149 and its provisions would not appear to apply. For example, the unencrypted PAN of a payment card plus an expiration date would constitute “account information” under HB 1149, but is not “personal information” as defined under Washington's breach notice law. As such, if there was unauthorized access to such account information it would not constitute a “breach” since no personal information was implicated, and therefore HB 1149 would not apply (even if card reissuance was necessary).
How does PCI come into play under HB 1149?
Under HB 1149 the certification of PCI compliance is part of HB 1149’s “safe harbor.” In other words, under certain circumstances, even if a company failed to take reasonable care or acted negligently in protecting “account information” (as referenced in Section 3. of HB 1149) issuing banks will not be able to recover their reissuance costs.
How does the HB 1149 “Safe Harbor” work?
It appears that if a Regulated Entity satisfies the requirements of Section 2.(2) it will not be liable if it runs afoul of the reasonable care/negligence aspects of Section 2.(3). There are two ways to achieve safe harbor. First, Regulated Entities shall not be liable under HB 1149 if the account information at issue was encrypted at the time of the breach. Second, a Regulated Entity shall not be liable if it was certified as PCI complaint at the time of the breach. Under HB 1149, a Regulated Entity is considered compliant if it was validated by an annual security assessment as long as an assessment took place no more than one year prior to the time of the breach.
Analysis of Encryption Safe Harbor: The encryption safe harbor option seems odd in light of the definition of “account information.” Account information as defined under HB 1149 is by definition “unencrypted.” Thus, if the information described in the definition of account information was encrypted at the time of the breach, it would not constiute “account information” as defined. In other words, this safe harbor is completely circular and redundant.
Analysis of the PCI Safe Harbor: The PCI Safe Harbor is very interesting because it plays into and recognizes the difference between “PCI compliance” and PCI validation/certification. To make a long story short, a company can certify or validate that it is PCI compliant simply by filling out some paperwork. However, that company could be completely wrong and not actually compliant with the PCI standard. The PCI Safe Harbor in HB 1149 does not appear to care whether a Regulated Entity is actually PCI compliant. It appears that the paperwork will do. In fact, Section 2.(2) specifically indicates the following:
For the purposes of this subsection (2), a processor, business, or vendor's security assessment of compliance is nonrevocable. The nonrevocability of a processor, business, or vendor's security assessment of compliance is only for the purpose of determining a processor, business, or vendor's liability under this subsection (2).
What this appears to state is that, as long as the Regulated Entity has done a security assessment and certified/validated it (e.g. filled out and turned in required PCI paperwork in the form of a self-assessment questionnaire or report on compliance), its assessment is “nonrevocable” even if it was incorrect. At least this is one reading of this language (and I would love to hear other theories on this reference).
What kind of encryption is required for the encryption safe harbor?
HB 1149 defines “encrypted” as follows:
(f) "Encrypted" means enciphered or encoded using standards reasonable for the breached business or processor taking into account the business or processor's size and the number of transactions processed annually.
Analysis: The “taking into account” language is extremely odd in the context of describing encryption. It is unclear how a processor’s size or transaction volume would impact its encryption requirements. Typically the key factors for encryption are the key length (e.g. number of bits), encryption algorithm and key management. What is unclear is whether companies of smaller size and lower transactions are allowed to use “weak encryption,” and if so, that would seem to undermine the purpose of the statute (again, I would love to hear from readers on what they think the “taking into account” qualification might mean to them).
When would this law come into effect?
HB 1149 takes effect on July 1, 2010. It would only apply to breaches taking place on or after July 1, 2010.
What happens if more than one entity was at fault for a breach?
According to Section 2.(6), the trier of fact (a judge or a jury) is responsible for determining the percentage of total fault that is attributable to every entity that was the proximate cause of a claimant’s damages.
Analysis: Again a strange provision. One wonders what percentage of fault would be applied to the person/entity that actually stole the payment card data (or whether that would even be part of the analysis).
House Passes Data Accountability and Trust Act (DATA)
On December 8, 2009, the Data Accountability and Trust Act -- HR 2221(DATA) moved one step closer to law by passing the House of Representatives. DATA is sponsored by Congressman Bobby Rush (D-IL). Note that the InfoLawGroup has previously commented on similar data security bills currently pending in the Senate. The DATA in Congress has similar elements as Senator Leahy's S. 1490, the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, including not only breach notice obligations, but also information security policy requirements.
Both the Leahy and Rush bills also impose increased obligations on "information brokers," defined as follows in the Rush bill:
(6) INFORMATION BROKER- The term `information broker'--
(A) means a commercial entity whose business is to collect, assemble, or maintain personal information concerning individuals who are not current or former customers of such entity in order to sell such information or provide access to such information to any nonaffiliated third party in exchange for consideration, whether such collection, assembly, or maintenance of personal information is performed by the information broker directly, or by contract or subcontract with any other entity; and
(B) does not include a commercial entity to the extent that such entity processes information collected by and received from a nonaffiliated third party concerning individuals who are current or former customers or employees of such third party to enable such third party to (1) provide benefits for its employees or (2) directly transact business with its customers.
(the Leahy bill uses the term "data broker", but has a similar definition). Information brokers would be required to submit their security policies to the FTC in the event their breach notice obligations where triggered. Moreover, the DATA imposes obligations on information brokers concerning data accuracy, data access and disputed data. Information brokers would also be required to maintain audit logs or similar measures "which facilitate the auditing or retracing of any internal or external access to, or transmissions of, any data containing personal information collected, assembled, or maintained by such information broker."
While sometimes touted as a "national" data security law, the DATA appears to apply only to those entities regulated by the FTC:
The requirements of sections 2 and 3 shall only apply to those persons, partnerships, or corporations over which the Commission has authority pursuant to section 5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
As such, it would not appear to apply to financial institutions, insurance companies, governmental bodies or common carriers (e.g. telecommunications companies or transportation companies).
Please note, while passage of DATA by the House is a major milestone, there may still be a long way before DATA becomes law. The Senate will have to pass their version of the bill and then it would have to go through reconciliation. Stay tuned.
Final Amendments to Massachusetts Data Security Regulations to Be Announced Shortly
Friday was a busy day for identity theft and data security regulations. Not long after the Federal Trade Commission announced it was extending the enforcement deadline for the Red Flags Rule for the fourth time, word came from BNA's Privacy & Security Law Report that the Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation (OCABR) had filed with the Massachusetts Secretary of State its final amendments to 201 CMR 17.00, the state's data security regulations. BNA reported that OCABR plans to make the amendments public sometime this week. BNA further reported that there are no major changes, but that there will be some clarification with respect to contracts between persons who own or license personal information and third-party service providers (201 CMR17.03(2)(f)(2)). You can check out Dave's post on the last round of significant revisions to the regulations in August, complete with redline. We have seen a lot of activity in the blogosphere about the new changes, but nothing official yet. And so far, no announcements of further delays in the effective date, currently set for March 1, 2010. We will report as soon as we hear more information.
Welcome! The InformationLawGroup is Here
We are thrilled to announce the official launch of the InformationLawGroup!
The InformationLawGroup is a group of attorneys that love the law and technology. We concentrate on legal issues concerning privacy, data security, information technology, e-commerce and intellectual property. We are a full service firm addressing a broad spectrum of matters, including transactions, compliance, breach notice and incident response and litigation.
We come together today after many years in large law firm and in-house roles. We are seasoned attorneys, including former “BigLaw” lawyers, smaller practitioners with clearly defined expertise and reputation in the field, and former in-house lawyers with specific information law experience and talent. These factors result in greatly increased efficiency and better results at a significantly lower price for the firm’s clients.
So who are we? Read more after the jump.
Tanya Forsheit. Litigation is my first professional love, and privacy and data security are a close second. Prior to founding the InformationLawGroup, I was the Co-Chair of Proskauer Rose LLP’s Privacy and Data Security practice group, where I launched the firm’s Privacy Law Blog in 2007. I work with clients to address legal requirements and best practices for protecting customer and employee information. I also have extensive experience handling complex commercial and appellate litigation for corporate and individual clients before federal and state courts. In 2009, I was honored to be named one of the Daily Journal’s Top 100 women litigators in California. I am First Vice President of the Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles, I sit on the Executive Committee of the Los Angeles County Bar Association Entertainment and Intellectual Property Section, and I am co-chair of the American Bar Association’s Information Security Committee Cloud Computing Law Working Group.
David Navetta. Dave has over 12 years of legal experience, including in the areas of information security and privacy contract and policy drafting, breach notice legal services, risk management consulting and regulatory compliance. Prior to starting his own firm, InfoSecCompliance LLC in 2005, he worked as an assistant general counsel for a major insurer’s eBusiness risk group, where he analyzed and forecasted information security, privacy and technology risks and drafted policies to cover such risks. He was a litigator at the Chicago office of an international law firm prior to going in-house. He currently serves as a Co-Chair of the ABA’s Information Security Committee, and is also Co-Chair of the PCI Legal Risk and Liability Working Group. Dave is now working on a book concerning PCI contracting.
Scott Blackmer. Scott has practiced information technology law since 1982. He has been listed in several peer-reviewed directories of prominent IT lawyers, including the Legal Media Group’s Guide to the World’s Leading Technology, Media & Telecommunications Lawyers. Formerly a partner in the Washington, D.C., and Brussels offices of WilmerHale, Scott serves on the executive management team of the First Law International legal network in Brussels. He also consults on privacy, data protection and security issues in association with HR Privacy Solutions in New York and Jeitosa Group International in San Francisco. He also serves as general counsel to the Trusted Computing Group, XDI.org, and OpenID Foundation, and he counsels other industry associations, corporations and entrepreneurs. He has advised federal and state agencies as well as the European Commission on privacy and security issues, and he currently serves as a privacy advisor to the U.S. Social Security Administration. Scott also arbitrates Internet domain name disputes brought before the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva. Over his long career, he has worked on transactions and licensing, compliance issues, litigation, and arbitration matters in over 100 countries.
All three of us frequently speak and write on privacy and data security issues. Dave and I are both Certified Information Privacy Professionals through the International Association of Privacy Professionals.
We have successfully served a diverse range of clients: from large Fortune 500 multinationals and name-brand traditional brick-and-mortar companies, to small start-ups and technology service providers. Our law practice uses an integrated approach combining technology and administrative controls, legal compliance, contractual vendor management and risk.
We look forward to meeting you soon!





