Colorado PUC Holds Hearing on Smart Grid Privacy Rules
On August 29, 2011, Administrative Law Judge G. Harris Adams issued a recommended decision before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) on proposed Smart Grid data privacy rules to regulate the information practices of electric utilities. The proposed rules will revise the current rules applicable to Smart Meter data privacy and disclosure rules in the Code of Colorado Regulations. According to the PUC, the new rules will provide more clarity on data privacy concerns and protect customer information from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same time granting customers access to their own information. A number of interested parties filed exceptions to the proposed rules, and on October 17, 2011, the PUC held a hearing to discuss and rule on the exceptions. Some of the highlights of the PUC hearing are discussed below.
The rules grant utilities unfettered use of customer data for regulated utility purposes. However, utilities will generally be permitted to share a customer’s data with third parties only after the customer provides informed consent. Utilities may obtain customer consent under the rules if a customer submits a consent form – which will be prescribed and supplied the PUC – electronically or by postal mail. The PUC granted an exception to the rule which will also allow customers to provide consent in person, provided that the customer produces appropriate identification. Customer consent will have no expiration date. The PUC rejected the Administrative Law Judge’s proposal that consent forms must be notarized, as the commissioners agreed that the notarization process is burdensome and unnecessary for authenticating customer consent. Utilities must also obtain the customer’s consent before using customer data for unregulated services.
The rules permit a utility to disclose customer data to a contracted agent, as long as the agent uses the data solely for the purpose of the contract between the agent and the utility. Several interested parties filed an exception to the rule, asking that contracted agents be granted unlimited secondary use of customer data. The PUC denied the exception, noting that this proposed exception was contrary to the purpose and spirit of the regulations. The regulations will continue to prohibit contracted agents from using customer data for a secondary commercial purpose unrelated to the purpose of the contract without first obtaining the customer’s consent.
While a number of the filed exceptions were denied by the PUC, the commissioners did agree to strike proposed Rule 3032, which would have given customers the option to place a data freeze on their utility account. The data freeze provisions provided customers with an opt-in opportunity to prevent utilities from disclosing customer data to third parties. However, since the proposed rules operate under the basic assumption that customer data will not be disclosed to third parties without customer consent, the commissioners agreed that the Rule 3032 was redundant and unnecessary.
Another notable decision of the PUC was the commissioners’ affirmation of the penalties as set forth in proposed Rule 3036. Interested parties argued that, without a cap on total liability, penalties issued under the Rule would be excessive. However, the PUC denied the exceptions to Rule 3036. Although the Rule provides for penalties that have the potential to be rather large, the PUC indicated that penalties will only apply for “intentional” violations of the rules.
The rules also require utilities to provide annual written notice to customers explaining their privacy and security policies governing access to and disclosure of customer data and aggregated data to third parties. During the hearing, the PUC agreed to allow utilities to deliver this notice to customers electronically. The PUC also agreed to give electric utilities until March 1, 2012 to file their compliance tariffs.
Colorado joins several other states that are seeking to regulate utilities’ use and disclosure of customer data. While some issues remain unresolved after the hearing, PUC staff will be circulating an updated draft of the rules that reflects the PUC’s recent decisions. We will continue to discuss this and other utility-related privacy initiatives on our blog as they develop, so check back often.
FTC Proposes Revisions to COPPA Rule
On September 15, 2011 the FTC issued proposed revisions to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (the “COPPA Rule”), which imposes requirements on web sites that are directed at and/or collect personal information from children younger than 13 years old. According to the FTC, the revisions are to “ensure that the Rule continues to protect children’s privacy, as mandated by Congress, as online technologies evolve.” The proposed amendments would modify the Rule in five areas: definitions, parental notice, parental consent mechanisms, confidentiality and security of children’s personal information, and safe harbor programs. Each of these may have a significant impact on a company’s current online practices. In this post we summarize the proposed revisions.
Definitions
The FTC proposes to modify particular definitions to update the Rule’s coverage and to streamline the Rule’s language. The COPPA Rule requires websites and online services to obtain parental consent before collecting personal information from children. The FTC proposes to change the definition of “personal information” to include geolocation information, photos and videos containing a child’s image, audio files containing a child’s voice, and certain types of persistent identifiers used for functions other than, or in addition to, support for the internal operations of a website or online service. In addition, the FTC proposes to modify and streamline the definition of “collects or collection.” First, the FTC aims to clarify that the definition includes all means of passive online tracking, irrespective of the technology used. Additionally, the current definition of “collects or collection” includes enabling children to publicly post personal information (e.g., on social networking sites or on blogs), “except where the operator deletes all individually identifiable information from postings by children before they are made public, and also deletes such information from the operator’s records.” Instead of a “100% deletion standard,” the FTC is proposing a “reasonable measures” standard. This means that websites and online services will not be deemed to be “collecting” children’s personal information if they employ technologies “reasonably designed to capture all or virtually all personal information inputted by children.” This change is intended to lower the hurdle to websites’ development and to encourage the development of systems “to detect and delete all or virtually all personal information that may be submitted by children prior to its public posting.”
Parental Notice
COPPA requires that websites and online services notify parents of their online information practices in two ways: on the website or online service (usually in a privacy policy), and in a “direct notice” delivered to a parent whose child seeks to register on the site or service. The FTC proposes to revise the notice requirements to reinforce COPPA’s goal of providing complete and clear information in the direct notice, and to rely less heavily on the online notice or privacy policy as a means of providing parents with information about operators’ information practices.
Parental Consent
Central to COPPA is the requirement that websites and online services must obtain parental consent before collecting, using, or disclosing children’s personal information. The FTC proposes to add several new methods to obtain parental consent to the Rule’s current list, including “electronic scans of signed parental consent forms, video-conferencing, and use of government-issued identification checked against a database, provided that the parent’s ID is deleted promptly after verification is done.” The FTC also proposes to remove the “e-mail plus” method of parental consent because it “has inhibited the development of more reliable methods of obtaining verifiable parental consent.”
Confidentiality and Security Requirements
To strengthen the Rule’s confidentiality and security requirements, the FTC proposes to require websites and online services ensure that any service providers or third-parties to whom they disclose a child’s personal information have in place reasonable procedures to protect the information. Additionally, the FTC proposes to add a new data retention and deletion provision. The new provision requires websites and online services to retain children’s personal information for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected. The new provision also requires websites and online services to delete children’s personal information by taking reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to, or use of, the information in connection with its deletion.
Safe Harbors
The COPPA statute established a “safe harbor” for participants in Commission-approved COPPA self-regulatory programs. The Rule provides that websites and online services fully complying with an approved safe harbor program will be “deemed to be in compliance” with the Rule. The FTC proposes to strengthen its oversight of self-regulatory safe harbor programs by mandating that, at a minimum, safe harbor programs conduct annual reviews of each of their members’ information practices and periodically report the results to the FTC.
Although the proposed amendments expand and clarify the Rule in several ways, the breadth of COPPA’s coverage remains unclear. For example, the FTC has indicated it will continue to consider whether short message services and multimedia messaging services are covered by COPPA.
The FTC is seeking comments on the proposed revisions, which are due on or before November 28, 2011.
Nonprofit Must Rehire Employees Axed for Facebook Complaints
In the first decision of its kind, a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”) Administrative Law Judge recently ruled on September 2, 2011 that a nonprofit organization unlawfully discharged employees for complaining about their jobs on Facebook. As we have previously discussed on our blog, the NLRB has been very aggressive in enforcing employees' right to engage in work-related discussions on social media. This is the first case involving Facebook that resulted in an ALJ decision following a hearing. Unlike prior NLRB enforcement actions, this case did not target the organization’s social media policy or involve a unionized workplace.
According to the NLRB decision, the employer Hispanics United of Buffalo fired five employees for criticizing work conditions on a Facebook comment thread. After one of the employees notified the NLRB regional office, NLRB Regional Director Rhonda Ley issued a complaint alleging that Hispanics United conducted unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act by “interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights” guaranteed in Section 7 of the NLRA. Section 7 provides in part that employees have the right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” The NLRB has interpreted Section 7 rights to apply to both unionized and non-unionized personnel.
Judge Arthur Amchan found that the employees’ were illegally discharged because the Facebook discussion was concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the NLRA. The discussion was protected because it involved a conversation among coworkers about their terms and conditions of employment. Although Hispanics United argued (in part) that the Facebook comments were not protected because persons other than Hispanics United employees may have seen them, Judge Amchan found that “irrelevant” as the first comment in the thread specifically “asked for responses from co-workers.” Furthermore, “just as the protection of Sections 7 and 8 of the Act does not depend on whether organizing activity was ongoing” Judge Amchan noted, “it does not depend on whether the employees herein had brought their concerns to management before they were fired, or that there is no express evidence that they intended to take further action, or that they were not attempting to change any of their working conditions.” The judge determined that the employees had not engaged in any conduct that could have forfeited their Section 7 rights. According to the decision, the comments were related to subject matter the employees had a protected right to discuss, there were no “outbursts,” and the employees had not violated any Hispanic United policies or rules. Although Hispanics United asserted that the employees’ conduct constituted harassment of an employee named on the Facebook comment thread in violation of its “zero tolerance” harassment policy, Judge Amchan found no evidence in the record supporting Hispanics United’s position.
In a first for a case involving employees' rights in the context of social media, the NLRB judge ordered Hispanics United to reinstate the five employees and awarded the employees back pay. Hispanics United was also ordered to “cease and desist from discharging its employees due to their engaging in protected concerted activities” and to post a notice at its Buffalo facility concerning employee rights under the NLRA and the organization's violations of those rights.
On the heels of the NLRB report on social media enforcement, this ruling provides further guidance to employers regarding the NLRB's application of Section 7 to social media and the growing number of NLRB's social media enforcement actions. As we noted both in the context of discussing the NLRB’s recent enforcement actions and the agency's social media report, employers should carefully review and adjust their communications and social media practices and policies to comply with the NLRB's guidance on employees' Section 7 rights.
Financial Industry Gets New Guidance on the Use of Social Media
Banks and other financial institutions face unique issues when it comes to the use of social media. Faced with conflicts between social media platform rules, customer expectations, self-regulatory standards, and the strict regulations that govern the industry, guidance has been needed. The industry received some of that guidance recently through a whitepaper issued by BITS, the technology arm of The Financial Services Roundtable whose members are 100 of the largest financial institutions in the U.S.
The report addresses the compliance, legal, operational, and reputational risks – and related mitigation strategies – of using social media in connection with a financial or banking operation. Regarding compliance, the report discusses the myriad of compliance areas relevant to banks, including marketing, privacy and security. For example, because social media web sites and web activities are deemed advertising by regulators, the report warns of the risks of failing to comply with various marketing laws and regulations applicable to the banking industry, including state Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices Acts and Prize and Gift Acts, as well as others that require additional steps for financial institutions, such as Truth in Lending, Truth in Savings, and FDIC membership rules. The paper predicts even stronger and more subjective requirements to come under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Risks of non-compliance vary widely – from litigation and reputation risk, regulatory enforcement actions and in some cases civil money penalties.
The report discusses generally the requirement under the FTC’s endorsement guidelines’ that online publishers “disclose relationships with advertisers when they receive free products for review, compensation or other consideration.” The requirement seems simple, but administration and enforcement of it can become complex. So, the report urges financial institutions to develop policies and practices for educating associates, bloggers and other endorsers regarding disclosure requirements, including guidelines about the required disclosure format. These new policies should also be confirmed consistent with the myriad of other policies that likely exists, and even some that may not be entirely obvious, including any Code of Conduct/Ethics Policies, Sarbanes-Oxley Policies, Marketing/Brand/Logo Enforcement Policies, Risk Management Policies, Employment Verification/ Professional Reference Policies and various others.
On the issues of privacy and security, financial institutions walk a tightrope when using social media. The report warns that protected data could be exposed much more readily as consumers interact with bank staff on social networks. The increasingly real-time nature and features of many social media sites pose additional risks because staff must know the report-recommended policies, remember them, and act accordingly – all in near real-time. This is all in addition to the risks of third parties, who could try to use such features to try to expose information and may be more likely to succeed given the conversational nature of the platforms and features. Also, since social media sites and companies often make changes to those policies as they add new features or expand their partnerships with other online companies, the report warns banks to be vigilant in monitoring the privacy policies and practices of the various social media sites they use.
Although it is no substitute for clear rules from the federal banking agencies and other regulators about banks’ use of social media, the BITS report helps summarize the issues to spot when navigating banks’ use of social media and how to begin resolving potential conflicts. The report is targeted to the financial industry, but because it covers use of employees’ information and resolution of institution’s internal policies, it could be a helpful read for those companies outside of the industry, as well. Read the report here.
CFPB Tasked with FCRA Interpretation - FTC Issues Staff Report to Aid Transition
Since the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) was adopted in 1970, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been the agency primarily responsible for interpreting the Act through formal rules and informal guidance materials. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 shifted the authority to publish FCRA rules and guidelines to the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). On July 21, 2011,to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the FCRA and aid the CFPB as it takes over interpreting the FCRA, the FTC issued a staff report entitled “Forty Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act: An FTC Staff Report and Summary of Interpretations.” The staff report provides important insight into how the CFPB will interpret and enforce the FCRA going forward. This post summarizes some of the highlights of the staff report and the implications of the FTC’s newly issued FCRA interpretations.
Changing Opinions
This is not the first time the FTC has issued a comprehensive FCRA report. Given the large volume of guidance materials it has amassed over time, the FTC released “Commentary on the FCRA ” in 1990 – a compilation of statements regarding how the FTC would interpret and enforce the FCRA. Much has changed since the FTC issued the 1990 Commentary: the FCRA has been significantly amended, the FTC has issued numerous new interpretive guidance documents, and developments in technology and industry practices have rendered parts of the Commentary obsolete or outdated. As a result, the FTC withdrew the 1990 Commentary when it issued the new staff report. The new staff report provides an overview of the FTC’s role in enforcing and interpreting the FCRA and includes a section-by-section summary of the FTC’s interpretations of the Act. The interpretations in the staff report differ from the 1990 Commentary in five significant areas, described below.
Commercial Transactions. The FCRA applies to written, oral, or other communications of information by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) that fit the definition of “consumer reports.” To be considered a consumer report, information communicated by a CRA must bear on a consumer’s credit worthiness, standing, or capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living. Additionally, the information must be used or expected to be used to establish the consumer’s eligibility for credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, employment, or other purposes specifically identified in the FCRA. One point of contention has been whether and how the FCRA applies in the context of an application for business credit as opposed to personal credit. Creditors will often obtain a credit report on the sole proprietor or other principal of a business and use the report to determine whether to extend credit to the business. It was the FTC’s position in the 1990 Commentary that “a report on a consumer for credit or insurance in connection with a business operated by the consumer is not a consumer report.” Courts have held that the purpose of the FCRA “is to protect consumers from inaccurate or arbitrary information in a consumer report which is used as a factor in determining an individual's eligibility for credit, insurance or employment” and the FCRA “does not apply to reports used for business, commercial or professional purposes.” For example, in Wrigley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. a commercial reporting service issued credit reports to subscribers who used the information when deciding whether to extend commercial credit to a construction company. The reports contained the personal financial information of the construction company’s president. The court held that the credit reports were for the extension of commercial credit – even though the reports contained personal credit information – therefore the FCRA did not apply.
The staff report details how the FTC currently interprets the FCRA’s application to commercial transactions. To be sure, “a report that concerns the consumer’s business history (as opposed to personal credit or employment history) that is collected and provided by a commercial reporting service solely for use in business transactions is not a ‘consumer report’” and the report provider is not a CRA. However, “a report from a CRA on the personal credit of a consumer to a business credit grantor is a ‘consumer report’ regardless of the purpose for which the information may in fact be used.” This means that reports to business credit grantors by commercial reporting services that compile data and provide reports only for commercial purposes are not “consumer reports” subject to the FCRA. On the other hand, a report on an individual based on information that was collected for the purpose of reporting on that individual is a consumer report and the FCRA applies, even if the report is furnished in connection with a commercial transaction.
Joint Users. Does an entity become a CRA by virtue of sharing a consumer report with another party? According to the FTC’s prior interpretation, a user could share a consumer report with another user without becoming a CRA under certain circumstances. An agent could share with its principal, an employee with employer, and two users could share a consumer report for the same permissible purpose with the consumer’s consent. In these scenarios, the entity sharing the report and the recipient were deemed “joint users” and the sharing entity escaped CRA status. The FTC has now abandoned the “joint user” terminology, focusing instead on whether an entity meets the statutory definition of a CRA. If a user shares a consumer report “for the purpose of providing consumer reports to third parties,” the user may be deemed a CRA. However, a user who obtains a consumer report and shares it with another simply to effectuate a particular transaction initiated by the consumer "is not providing consumer reports to third parties” and, therefore, is not a CRA.
Departments of Motor Vehicles. The FTC no longer takes the position a DMV is a CRA when it provides motor vehicle reports for insurance underwriting purposes – even if it does so for a fee. Although a DMV or other government agency that supplies public records to third parties might be considered a CRA based on a literal reading of the FCRA, the staff report notes that such an interpretation would “lead to absurd results.” If government sources of public record information were CRAs, “government agencies would be required to suppress accurate public record information more than seven years old” and “those who provide information for use in public records – such as police officers – would be deemed furnishers, subject to a host of responsibilities under the FCRA.”
Identified Information. The FTC generally considers “credit guides” – listings that rate how well consumers pay their bills – to be consumer reports subject to the FCRA. However, the FTC previously did not consider credit guides to be consumer reports if they were coded to prevent the disclosure of a consumer’s identity. The FTC now takes the position that that credit guides (as well as other information) that do not identify consumers by name may constitute consumer reports if such guides can “otherwise reasonably be linked to the consumer.” The FTC voiced its concern that coding (particularly by Social Security number or other sensitive data) could readily lead to the disclosure of a consumer’s identity due to advancements in technology and the increasing availability of consumer data.
New Interpretations
The staff report addresses several issues not covered by the 1990 Commentary in an attempt to provide clarity regarding FCRA provisions that have generated a significant number of questions from the public. Importantly, the staff report delves into detail regarding when it is permissible for CRAs to issue (and users to obtain) consumer reports under the FCRA. One permissible purpose to obtain a consumer report is “in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the … review or collection of an account of the consumer.” The staff report states that the “review” permissible purpose applies only when a creditor has an existing account relationship with a consumer and uses a consumer report solely to decide whether to modify the terms of the account. This means that even if a creditor has a permissible “review” purpose to obtain a consumer report, it may not exploit the report to market other products or services to the consumer. CRAs are also permitted to furnish a consumer report according to the written instructions of the consumer to whom the report relates. The staff report states that written consent only qualifies as an “instruction” if it clearly authorizes the issuance of a consumer report on that consumer. For example, “I authorize you to procure a consumer report on me” is sufficient if it is in writing, but the consumer’s signature on a form stating “I understand that where appropriate, credit bureau reports may be obtained” is not. The FTC highlights a consumer’s electronic signature may be an acceptable method of providing written instructions under FCRA. To be valid under the ESIGN Act, electronic authorization must be in a form that can be retained and retrieved in a perceivable form. The FTC notes “whether an e-mail, a mouse click ‘yes,’ or other electronic means clearly conveys the consumer’s instructions depends on the specific facts.”
The staff report also reflects the statutory modifications made to the FCRA over the years. Recently, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the FCRA to impose new requirements on users of consumer reports. The FCRA requires a person taking adverse action based in whole or in part on a consumer report to provide adverse-action notice to the affected consumer. Under new rules that took effect July 21, 2011, users of credit scores must include those scores (and related information) in adverse-action notices. This requirement also applies to adverse-action decisions not related to credit. Consequently, when a user takes an adverse action based on consumer report information, regardless of the weight the credit score plays in the decision, the user must provide the consumer with a host of new information. Additionally, the FCRA requires creditors to provide risk-based pricing notice to consumers when, based on the report, the creditors grant credit or amend existing credit on terms that are “materially less favorable” than the most favorable terms obtained by a substantial portion of consumers. The Federal Reserve Board and the FTC recently amended their respective adverse action and risk-based pricing rules to reflect the recent FCRA amendments. The new rules raise a host of questions, many of which are addressed in the staff report. As the new rules apply when a credit score is used in the evaluation of a consumer, the staff report squarely addresses what constitutes a credit score and when a credit score is considered “used” under the rules. The staff report clarifies that a score that is not used to predict creditworthiness, such as an insurance score, is not a credit score and need not be disclosed. The staff report also makes clear that “use” occurs at a very low threshold - if a credit score plays any role in a user’s decision regarding a consumer then it must be disclosed.
Future of FCRA Interpretation and Enforcement
The newly created CFPB is now the primary agency responsible for interpreting the FCRA. The CFPB is vested with exclusive rulemaking authority over all federal consumer financial law – this includes the authority to issue rules under existing consumer protection statutes such as the FCRA (with limited exceptions) as well as new rules to prohibit unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices. The primary role of the CFPB will be supervision in order to “prevent harm to consumers from unlawful financial practices and ensure that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.” To accomplish this, CFPB is assembling a team of examiners that will directly observe the business practices of entities subject to CFPB jurisdiction. Examiners will assess institutions’ compliance with the FCRA and other federal consumer protection laws. According to the CFPB website, the agency will require businesses to change their practices to comply with the law and may also “require improved employee training, implementation of better policies and procedures or quality controls, and in more serious cases, monetary compensation to consumers.”
Since the adoption of the FCRA, the FTC has enforced the Act at the federal level by bringing enforcement actions against CRAs, entities that furnish information to CRAs, and users of consumer reports such as creditors and employers. The CFPB and FTC now have joint FCRA enforcement authority over a host of industries. As we noted in a previous post, the FTC is actively addressing FCRA compliance and we expect its efforts to extend beyond traditional CRAs. Earlier this year the FTC found that Social Intelligence Corporation - an Internet and social media background screening service - is a CRA subject to the FCRA. Like the FTC, we expect the CFPB will broadly interpret and actively enforce the FCRA. In so doing, the CFPB may give heavy weight to the FTC’s interpretations of the FCRA, making the staff report invaluable to businesses handling consumer report information. With new FCRA rules in place and an additional agency tasked with FCRA enforcement, businesses are wise to determine whether they are subject to the FCRA and to consider FCRA compliance.
Federal Information Security and Breach Notification Law Approved by House Trade Subcommittee
On July 20, 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee’s Trade Subcommittee approved the Secure and Fortify Electronic Data Act (the “SAFE Data Act”). The Act would require any business that maintains personal information to implement an information security program and notify affected individuals in the event of an information security breach. The SAFE Data Act would preempt the over 45 existing state information security and breach notification laws and task the Federal Trade Commission with developing information security rules implementing the Act.
Some legislators and advocates have criticized as too narrow the definition of “personal information” that is within the scope of the Act. Specifically, the Safe Data Act would require breach notification only when an individual’s name, phone number or credit card number is compromised along with a Social Security number, driver's license number or other government-issued ID. This definition is significantly narrower than the personal information within the scope of the numerous existing state breach notification laws. One of the concerns is that because the Safe Data Act would preempt existing state information security and breach notification laws, the passage of the Act would lead to less protection for consumers.
Existing state breach laws typically require notification when an individual's first name or initial and last name are compromised in conjunction with a Social Security number, driver’s license number, government-issued ID number or a financial account number. In practice, the gap between state breach laws and the Safe Data Act is even wider. This is because companies operating nationwide affected by a multi-state breach often follow the broadest notification requirements among the various state laws. With some state laws requiring notification when, for example, a credit card number, financial account number, Social Security number, taxpayer ID or biometric data alone (without the individual’s name) is compromised, the practical notification threshold under current state breach notification laws may be significantly lower than that proposed by the Safe Data Act. Committee members expect the bill to evolve to address this and other concerns as it moves through Congress.
InfoLawGroup Says:
While there are disagreements regarding the specifics, the Trade Subcommittee’s approval of the Safe Data Act (especially while Congress is paralyzed by the debt ceiling negotiations) suggests strong support for federal information security legislation. For businesses, perhaps the most significant aspect of the Act is the preemption of over 45 existing state information security and breach notification laws. The preemption provision would provide much needed certainty for businesses in addressing information security breaches that currently are subject to the multitude of state requirements.
Capitalizing on Privacy Practices - Study Indicates Consumers Will Pay for Privacy
Consumers are more likely to purchase products from online retailers who are protective of consumer privacy, according to researchers at Carnegie Mellon University. The study, entitled “The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study” found that the availability and accessibility of information regarding online retailers’ privacy practices can affect consumers’ decisions to purchase products online. Interestingly, in contrast to the commonly held view that consumers are unlikely to pay for privacy, the study indicates that “when privacy information is made more salient and accessible, some consumers are willing to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective websites.” The study is consistent our discussion in a previous post of the “privacy by design” framework. As we discussed, businesses that address privacy into the design of their products and services are less likely to face consumer and regulatory backlash or incur the costs of remediation. Yet businesses may benefit in another way from protective and consumer-friendly privacy practices - the results of this recent study indicate that such practices may be leveraged as a selling point.
The Experiment
Many websites use machine-readable codes that tell a browser their privacy policies - such as whether a website sends cookies and with whom the website shares personal information gained from those cookies. Websites commonly use Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) compact policy “tokens” such as “NID” (no identified user information collected), which represent a standardized privacy expression defined in P3P specifications. The authors of the study used a modified version of Privacy Finder, a search engine that annotates a user’s Google or Yahoo! search results with “privacy meter” icons. Privacy Finder generates these icons through an automated analysis of the P3P policies of the websites a user visits. These icons graphically represent how well a website’s privacy policy matches preferences specified by the user. The authors configured their search engine to calculate privacy warnings based on a website’s sharing of personal financial information, purchase information, or personally identifying information; a website’s refusal to allow a user to remove the user’s personal information from marketing lists; and a user’s inability to view her personal information on a website.
Three groups of participants (two control groups and one test group) using the modified search engine were told to search for products online and purchase those products using their own credit cards. All participants were instructed to purchase both an eight-pack of Duracell AA batteries and the “Pocket Rocket Jr.,” a vibrating sex toy. Both products average about $15 including the cost of shipping and are widely available online. One control group did not see any privacy meter icons when they searched for the products to purchase. The other control group saw the icons, but was told that the icons merely indicated websites’ “handicap accessibility” - a characteristic chosen as a control condition because it’s considered to be generally irrelevant to most online consumers. The test group saw the icons and was told that the icons indicated the degree of websites’ privacy protections. All participants in the study could access merchants’ privacy policies by clicking on privacy policy links displayed on the websites they visited.
The results of the study offer new insight into consumers’ valuations of personal data and online behavior. Control group participants generally purchased their products from the websites offering the lowest prices. In contrast, test group participants - who saw the privacy meter icons and knew that the icons represented the level of privacy protections utilized by the websites - were more likely to make purchases from websites offering medium or high levels of privacy, even if those sites charged higher prices for identical products. Additionally, participants demonstrated that they would spend an average of 59 to 62 cents more to buy the same product from websites offering stronger privacy protections.
The Take Away
How can businesses capitalize on these findings? The study suggests that businesses that incorporate "privacy by design" into their online business models help promote greater consumer awareness of and control over personal information, attracting privacy-conscious consumers. Developing and implementing a website privacy policy is one aspect of the “privacy by design” framework – how a business collects and handles data online is more transparent with a privacy policy in place. While displaying a privacy policy is a good first step toward transparency, 70% of people surveyed by the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania disagreed with the statement that “privacy policies are easy to understand.” Accordingly, if a merchant seeks to promote its online privacy practices in order to boost sales, consumers must be able to identify and understand the merchant’s privacy practices for those practices to affect consumer behavior. Typically, however, online merchants display only small links to their privacy policies at the bottom of their websites. As such, privacy policies are often overlooked by consumers. Recently, the Federal Trade Commission and consumer advocacy groups have been advocating just-in-time notice as a means of making information about privacy practices more transparent and accessible to consumers. The results of the Carnegie Mellon study seem to confirm the benefits of this approach. The study indicates that purchasing decisions may be affected when privacy practices are presented to consumers in a user-friendly fashion when they are browsing online.
The study also suggests that businesses “may use technological means to showcase their privacy-friendly privacy policies and thereby gain a competitive advantage” and “maximize profits.” Specifically, “if the adoption of P3P increases, businesses protective of customer privacy may be able to attract consumers by posting their P3P policies and signaling good privacy practices.”
Supreme Court Pro-Business and First Amendment - Targeted Regulations in Trouble
What do pharmaceutical and data mining companies have in common with the video game industry? For starters, both recently prevailed in front of the U.S. Supreme Court when they challenged state legislation on First Amendment grounds. By a 6-3 vote on June 23, 2011, the Court struck down a Vermont statute that prohibited pharmacies and similar entities from disclosing prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes. The statute also barred pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from using prescriber-identifying (“PI”) information for marketing purposes. The Court held that the statute’s speaker- and content-based restrictions violated the First Amendment right of pharmaceutical manufacturers and data mining companies. By a 7-2 vote on June 27, 2011, the Court struck down a California statute that sought to prohibit the rental or sale of violent video games to minors for violating the First Amendment. The statute imposed a restriction on the content of protected speech and California failed to demonstrate that the statute served a compelling government interest. In both cases, the Court evidenced its commitment to free speech through broad readings of the First Amendment as well as its skepticism of government regulation controlling private behavior. What are the potential implications of these decisions? This post gives you the highlights.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
When pharmacies fill prescriptions they collect information such as the doctor prescribing the medication, as well as the medication and dosage prescribed. Under federal law, this data excludes information that could be used to identify individual patients. Pharmacies often sell this PI information to data miners who produce reports on prescriber behavior. Data miners then lease their reports to pharmaceutical companies. Pharmaceutical companies use data miners’ reports to identify specific doctors they believe might be interested in their products. The companies dispatch sales representatives, known as “detailers,” to meet individually with these targeted doctors. Detailers pitch their company’s products, answer questions about existing products, and try to convince the doctors to prescribe their company’s products more frequently. Since advertising is most effective when it is directed at purchasers who are likely to be interested in the advertised product, detailing allows pharmaceutical companies to get more bang for their advertising buck.
Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law. The Vermont legislature enacted the Prescription Confidentiality Law in 2007 in an effort to curtail detailers from convincing doctors to prescribe expensive name-brand drugs rather than low-cost generics. Vermont justified its statute, in part, by claiming it had a strong interest in promoting public health and protecting medical privacy. The statute provided that PI data could not be sold by pharmacies and similar entities, disclosed by those entities for marketing purposes, or used for marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers absent the prescriber's consent. However, the prohibitions on sale, disclosure, and use were subject to a host of exceptions that permitted entities possessing PI data to sell and use the data for a variety of purposes other than marketing. In addition, the Vermont statute specifically prohibited pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from using PI data for marketing or promoting prescription drugs. Interestingly, the statute permitted insurers and benefits managers to use PI data to require or encourage doctors to prescribe generics. Similarly, another Vermont statute permits the state to use PI data in a “counter-detailing” program to target doctors and persuade them to switch to low-cost generics. Vermont itself could thus use PI data to market generic drugs while at the same time restricting pharmaceutical companies and data miners from using PI data for marketing. Three companies that sell the information they gather — IMS Health, SDI and Source Healthcare Analytics — challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds. The drug industry’s trade group, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, joined the lawsuit.
Commercial Speech and Heightened Scrutiny. Whether speech protected by the First Amendment was involved at all was a contentious issue in Sorrell. Vermont argued that sales, transfer, and use of PI data are conduct, not speech. Public Citizen filed an amicus brief in support of Vermont’s position, arguing that aggregate PI data lacks the expressive element required for strong First Amendment protection. Some view aggregate information akin to an ordinary commodity (one lower court compared it to beef jerky) that the legislature has broad latitude to regulate in its discretion. The Court disagreed, noting “the creation and dissemination of information are speech for First Amendment purposes” and “Vermont’s statute could be compared with a law prohibiting trade magazines from purchasing or using ink.”
Vermont argued in the alternative that if speech was involved, heightened judicial scrutiny was unwarranted because the statute was merely a commercial regulation - restrictions on protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity. Although the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce from imposing incidental burdens on speech, the Court noted that in addition to the burdens it imposed, the statute was aimed at particular speakers and restricted specific content. Such targeted censorship of commercial speech warrants heightened judicial scrutiny, and violates the First Amendment unless it achieves at least a substantial governmental interest.
Vermont attempted to justify the statute in part by claiming that it fulfilled “an important privacy interest in giving prescribers control over the use of their prescription-history information.” “While Vermont’s stated policy goals may be proper,” stated Justice Kennedy for the majority, the Court didn’t buy the argument. The legislative history of the statute demonstrated the Vermont legislature was mainly concerned that detailers were too effective at convincing doctors to prescribe their name-brand products – privacy concerns were a mere side note. Additionally, the statute’s many exceptions permitted those in possession of PI data to distribute it without prescribers’ consent “in almost every instance.” The only restriction on the non-consensual use of PI data was that the information couldn’t be used for marketing by drug companies. “The statute thus is not a genuine attempt to protect prescribers’ privacy,” according to the Court. Vermont’s interest in giving prescribers “a slight degree of control” over the use of their prescription history data did not justify the statute’s restrictions on free speech. “Privacy is a concept too integral to the person and a right too essential to freedom to allow its manipulation to support just those ideas the government prefers,” according to the Court.
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
On October 7, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law California Assembly Bill 1179, which prohibited the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors and required their packaging to be labeled “18.” Representatives from the video game and software industries brought a preenforcement challenge to the statute. The Court held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional content-based restriction on protected speech.
Video Games Entitled to First Amendment Protection. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that all speech that communicates ideas, including video games, is protected by the First Amendment. The Court emphasized the basic tenet that content-based restrictions on expression – such as the California statute’s violence-based restriction - are presumptively invalid. The rule is subject to a few limited exceptions for historically unprotected speech such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words. Essentially, California’s statute attempted to categorize violent video games as obscenity beyond reach of the First Amendment’s protection. The statute covered games “in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are depicted” in a manner that a reasonable person “would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors.” According to the Court, California tried to make its content-based restriction look like obscenity regulation by excluding video games with literary, artistic, political, or scientific value from the statute’s coverage (language borrowed from Supreme Court obscenity jurisprudence). However, the Court emphasized that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment only covers depictions of sexual conduct, not “whatever a legislature finds shocking.” Just last term, the Court held in United States v. Stevens that “new categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.” The holding in Stevens controlled the case at issue – “violence is not part of the obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated.” Thus the Court determined that video games are protected speech under the First Amendment.
Strict Scrutiny Applied. The Court then subjected the statute to strict scrutiny because it imposed a content-based restriction on protected speech. In other words, California had to demonstrate that the Act was justified by a compelling government interest and was narrowly drawn to serve that interest. No doubt there is a legitimate interest in protecting children from harm. California argued that video games present a unique set of problems because they are interactive - players participate in the violent action on screen and determine its outcome. The Court rejected the argument as “all literature is interactive,” referencing Choose-Your-Own-Adventure stories where the reader makes decisions that determine the plot by following instructions about which page to turn to (remember those? I do!).
A belief shared by many – including the California legislature – is that children exposed to violence in video games are more likely to experience feelings of aggression and to exhibit violent antisocial or aggressive behavior. California justified the Act by claiming a “compelling interest in preventing violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior, and in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors who play violent video games.” Yet to survive strict scrutiny California was required to specifically identify an actual problem in need of solving and demonstrate that the curtailment of free speech was necessary to the solution. California didn’t meet that standard – it didn’t show a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to children. According to the Court, studies purporting to show a connection between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children “do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively” and “suffer from significant, admitted flaws in methodology.” Even if violent video games produce some effect on children's feelings of aggression, “those effects are both small and indistinguishable” from effects produced by exposure to other media such as violent cartoons. Since “California has (wisely) declined” to restrict other forms of violent speech, the Court considered the Act to be “wildly underinclusive” when judged against its asserted justification. According to the Court, underinclusiveness indicates that the government is disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint – in this case, California singled out the purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment without sufficient justification.
The Impact - Regulations for the Future… Or Not
With greater frequency, new technologies and marketing strategies introduce a profit motive into what would otherwise be protected speech. In a number of past opinions, the Court has given the government greater latitude when regulating commercial speech. Yet the majority in Sorrell gave strong First Amendment protections to speech that is commercial in nature. This may be good news for Internet advertising companies despite the growing number of recent proposals for government regulation of behavioral advertising. Using data about a user’s browsing history to deliver targeted advertisements to consumers is quite similar to the practice of “detailing” used by pharmaceutical companies. If the government tries to regulate online tracking, the industry may ask the courts to strike those regulations down using Sorrell as a precedent. Sorrell and Brown indicate that despite an industry’s profit motive, government regulations containing speaker- and content-based restrictions must address genuine, recognizable harms in order to survive heightened judicial scrutiny. However, it’s notoriously difficult to identify and quantify privacy-related harms. After Sorrell, legislatures will need to design privacy regulations more carefully, focusing on restricting industry practices that actually cause cognizable harms to individuals.
Rather than regulate in the face of this First Amendment tightrope, perhaps leaving the industry to self-regulate is preferable, particularly when the harms are nebulous and there are alternative ways to mitigate them. In Sorrell, Vermont contended that its Prescription Confidentiality Law protected doctors from “harassing sales behaviors.” Yet Vermont offered no explanation why remedies other than content-based rules would be inadequate. The Court noted that physicians can, and often do, simply decline to meet with detailers, including detailers who use PI data. Additionally, “Doctors who wish to forgo detailing altogether are free to give ‘No Solicitation’ or ‘No Detailing’ instructions to their office managers or to receptionists at their places of work.”
Justice Breyer dissented in Brown, stating “the First Amendment does not disable government from helping parents make such a choice here - a choice not to have their children buy extremely violent, interactive video games, which they more than reasonably fear pose only the risk of harm to those children.” California State Senator Leland Yee (D-San Francisco), original author of California Assembly Bill 1179, responded to the Court’s decision by stating “It is simply wrong that the video game industry can be allowed to put their profit margins over the rights of parents and the well-being of children.” Again, there are viable alternatives that address the potential harms raised in Brown – perhaps rendering regulation of protected speech unnecessary. As the National Association of Broadcasters noted in its amicus brief, “technology that can limit youth access to violent media has proven to be effective” and “the government should continue its constitutionally appropriate role in developing and promoting technological tools to assist parents in monitoring their children's use of media.” Even absent blocking technologies, the industry’s voluntary rating system informing consumers about the content of video games and responsible parenting can help protect children from violent media. Nothing prohibits parents from telling their kids “no” – they can simply (and have the right to) restrict their children’s access to media they deem inappropriate.
Conclusion
One core principle we can take away from this pair of cases was summed up by Justice Scalia in Brown: “whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary when a new and different medium for communication appears.” In Sorrell, Vermont asked for an exception to the rule that information is speech, but the Court found no need to consider Vermont’s request. Speaker- and content-based burdens on protected expression are sufficient to justify application of heightened judicial scrutiny, even if the information at issue is “a mere commodity.” Content-based restrictions were also the death of California’s violent video game statute in Brown. Brown evidences the Court’s unwillingness to expand the categories of speech that fall outside of the protections of the First Amendment. The bottom line is that the ambit of protected speech and expression is broad and the exclusions are narrow.
According to Greg Beck, who filed an amicus brief in Sorrell on behalf of Public Citizen, legislators need to be careful about the scope of regulations they enact given the Court’s recent stance on the scope of First Amendment protection. Regulations that are too narrow may unfairly target particular speakers. Regulations that are too broad may not be fully supported by the government’s rationale, thereby burdening more speech than justified. Given the Court’s recent decisions striking down statutes in the face of First Amendment challenges, perhaps regulation should take a back seat to alternative solutions when speech is involved. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Sorrell, “Many are those who must endure speech they do not like, but that is a necessary cost of freedom.”
Partners Justine Young Gottshall and Jamie Rubin Join InfoLawGroup
InfoLawGroup LLP is delighted to welcome to the firm partners Justine Young Gottshall and Jamie Rubin. Gottshall and Rubin are former partners at Wildman, Harrold Allen & Dixon in Chicago. As nationally-recognized leaders in Digital, Media, Advertising, Privacy and Promotions law, they bring new depth to InfoLawGroup’s practice.
Rubin's practice covers the spectrum of traditional and emerging advertising, promotions and entertainment issues, including social media campaigns and marketing through new technologies. Rubin is recognized in Chambers USA as a Leader in the Field in Illinois in the area of Media and Entertainment. He is a graduate of the John Marshall School of Law.
Gottshall is a seasoned privacy and digital media attorney, whose broad practice includes privacy, data security, technology, digital marketing and advertising issues. She is recognized in Chambers USA as a national Leader in the Field for her work in the area of Privacy & Data Security and in Illinois in the area of Media and Entertainment. Justine was named in 2007 to Chicago Lawyer and Chicago Daily Law Bulletin’s prestigious “40 Under Forty.” She is a graduate of Stanford Law School.
Both Rubin and Gottshall are frequent lecturers in their field and have each authored numerous publications. Justine is a Certified Information Privacy Professional through the International Association of Privacy Professionals and is a member of their Educational Advisory Board. Both are members of the Promotion Marketing Association. Jamie is an active member of the Legal and Government Affairs Committee of the PMA and was the co-chair of the 2010 Annual Marketing Law Conference.
California Federal Court Dismisses Bulk of Privacy Suit Against Facebook
In late 2010, David Gould and Mike Robertson filed a class action lawsuit against Facebook for disclosing users’ personal information to third-party advertisers without users’ consent. The Plaintiffs asserted eight causes of action against Facebook, including violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Expressing skepticism about the actual harm alleged by the Plaintiffs, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the claims against Facebook on May 12, 2011.
According to the complaint, when a user clicks on one of Facebook’s third-party advertisements, Facebook sends a “Referrer Header” to the corresponding advertiser. This header contains the specific webpage address that the user was viewing before clicking on the advertisement, and reveals personally identifiable information to the advertiser such as the user’s name, gender, and picture. The Plaintiffs brought this class action suit on behalf of themselves and all Facebook users in the United States who clicked on a third-party advertisement displayed on Facebook after May 28, 2006.
ECPA Claims
The Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Wiretap Act (which applies to communications in transmission) and the Stored Communications Act (which applies to communications in storage). Both prohibit electronic communication services such as Facebook from divulging the contents of communications to parties other than the “addressee or intended recipient.” According to the complaint, when a Facebook user clicks on a third-party advertisement, the user asks Facebook to send an electronic communication – the Referrer Header - to the advertiser. The Plaintiffs claimed that users do not expect and do not consent to Facebook’s disclosure of all of the contents of those communications (e.g. their personal information) to the advertisers.
The court interpreted these allegations in two ways. Under the first interpretation, a user’s click on an advertisement constitutes a communication from the user to Facebook - the content of the user’s communication to Facebook is a request that Facebook send a subsequent communication to the advertiser. As the communication is sent from the user to Facebook in this scenario, Facebook is the intended recipient of the communication and therefore not liable under ECPA for disclosing the communication to advertisers. Under the second interpretation, a user’s click on an advertisement constitutes a communication from the user to the advertiser; by clicking on an advertisement, a user asks Facebook to pass the communication along to the advertiser. In this scenario, Facebook cannot be liable under ECPA for divulging the communication to the advertiser because the advertiser is the addressee or intended recipient. As such, the court held as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violations of ECPA under either interpretation.
California Consumer Protection - Personal Information is Not Property
The Plaintiffs also sought damages under the UCL. To assert a UCL claim, a plaintiff needs to have “suffered injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” The Plaintiffs claimed they lost property – their personally identifiable information – as a result of Facebook’s conduct. The court dismissed the claim, expressly holding that personal information does not constitute property for purposes of the UCL. In addition, the court limited the scope of its prior ruling in Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC , which considered claims under the UCL after AOL inadvertently disclosed sensitive personal information of its users to the public. In contrast to that alleged by the Plaintiffs, AOL’s disclosure of personal information was not something users’ bargained for when they “signed up and paid fees for” AOL’s services. According to the court “a plaintiff who is a consumer of certain services (i.e. who ‘paid fees’ for those services) may state a claim under certain California consumer protection statutes when a company, in violation of its own policies, discloses personal information about its consumers to the public.” Because the Plaintiffs did not pay to use Facebook, the court dismissed the UCL claim with prejudice.
What is Left?
While dim, there is some light at the end of the tunnel for the Plaintiffs in this case. The court rejected Facebook’s argument that the Plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that the Plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury-in-fact to continue the case in federal court. Additionally, the court permitted the Plaintiffs to re-file five of the eight dismissed claims. Yet even with the chance to re-file, actual harm in the privacy litigation context remains a difficult concept for plaintiffs to prove - just recently another privacy-related lawsuit involving flash cookies was dismissed for lack of actual harm. This decision once again demonstrates that plaintiffs attempting to recover damages for privacy violations face an uphill battle. We will keep you updated if and when this case progresses.
Changes to HIPAA Privacy Rule Proposed by HHS - Find Out Who Has Accessed Your Health Records
On May 31, 2011 the Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would add substantial data privacy requirements to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. One of the requirements the HHS proposed pursuant to both the HITECH Act and its more general authority under HIPAA is for individuals to have the right to request from a covered entity (such as a health care provider or a health plan) a list of any individuals or entities that have accessed the individuals’ electronic health records. Currently, HIPAA and HHS regulations require covered entities to track access to health records, but they covered entities are not required to provide that information to patients. The proposed rule would give patients the right to request an “access report” which would document the identities of those who electronically viewed their protected health information. “This proposed rule represents an important step in our continued efforts to promote accountability across the health care system, ensuring that providers properly safeguard private health information,” said Georgina Verdugo, Director of the Office for Civil Rights. “We need to protect peoples’ rights so that they know how their health information has been used or disclosed.”
The right to an access report would apply only to health information that is maintained using an electronic system, as tracking access to paper records is not automated and would be unduly burdensome according to HHS. The proposed regulations would require covered entities to generate, upon request, an access report from access log data, which is collected by electronic record systems each time a user accesses protected health information. Access reports would detail the access by covered entities as well as business associates –entities that create, receive, maintain, or transmit certain health-related information on behalf of covered entities. The proposed rule requires covered entities and business to retain access logs for no less than three years so that an access reports can document access to the individual’s health information for the three years prior to the individual’s request for the report.
Covered entities and business associates are already required to comply with the HIPAA Security Rule, which obligates them to track access to protected health information. As such, HHS believes that the proposed rule will not be unduly burdensome. According to HHS, many electronic systems are already configured to log the activities that the proposed access reports would reference.
Under the proposed rule, access reports would include the date and time of access, and the name of the individual or entity accessing an individual’s health information. Additionally, if available, an access report would include a description of the information that was accessed and of the action taken by the user (e.g., whether they created, modified or deleted the information). Access reports also must include a statement informing individuals of their right to request access reports in their notices of privacy practices. Additionally, while individuals would be entitled to receive their first access report free of charge, the proposed rule would allow covered entities to charge reasonable, cost-based amounts for any subsequent reports requested within a 12-month period.
To minimize the volume of data in an access report, covered entities could give individuals the option to limit the coverage of the report by a specific date, time period, or person. For example, the individual requesting a report could elect to limit an access report to disclose only whether a particular family member accessed the individual’s health records within the last six months. Additionally, HHS is recommending – although not requiring in the proposed rule – that covered entities offer individuals the option to limit access reports to specific organizations. For example, if an individual does not wish to learn whether his or her health records were accessed by business associates, the covered entity would not need to obtain access logs from the relevant business associate to include in the access report the covered entity provides to the individual.
The proposed rule would require covered entities and business associates that implemented electronic record systems after January 1, 2009 to produce access reports beginning January 1, 2013. Entities that have implemented electronic record systems acquired on or before January 1, 2009 would be required to comply with the proposed rule beginning January 1, 2014. HHS has requested comments regarding a variety of issues the proposed rule has raised, and will receive comment submissions until August 1, 2011 (to submit a comment, click HERE ).
InfoLawGroup’s Nicole Friess and Boris Segalis collaborated on this blog post.
District Ct. Holds Use of Facebook at Work Does Not Violate the CFAA
Every now and then I wonder what goes through the mind of some litigation parties and their respective attorneys. Case in point the ongoing case of Wendi J. Lee v. PMSI, Inc., 8:10-cv-2904, out of the U.S. Middle District of Florida within the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Ms. Lee filed suit against PMSI, her former employer, in Florida state court after being fired from her position as a Proposal Developer in PMSI’s Marketing Department. In her complaint she alleged violations by PMSI of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Florida’s analogous Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), for “discrimination because of pregnancy.”
After removing to federal court, PMSI moved to dismiss count 2 (the FCRA claim), which was denied, and then answered, which was in turn followed by an amended answer with a counterclaim “for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, as amended by the Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 2707.” PMSI’s counterclaim maintained that “Lee’s internet usage substantially exceed the usage of her coworkers in the Marketing Department” and that such usage “exceeded her authorization to use the internet by accessing and spending large amounts of paid work time visiting personal websites such as Facebook . . . while on company paid time and from a company owned computer.”
The Court's Order in response struck PMSI's attempted use of the CFAA with prejudice.
In its counterclaim PMSI concluded that Lee's actions violated the Company’s Computer Usage Policy and that as to the necessary CFAA hook “[t]he Company suffered a loss from this unproductive time that Lee spent on these unauthorized websites” which “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the . . . conduct by Lee . . . suffered financial losses in excess of $5,000, due to her lack of productivity, as work that should have been performed by her had to be given to others and in wages paid to her.”
The Court's Order
In response, Ms. Lee moved to dismiss the counterclaim via a Motion to strike Defendant's Untimely Amended Pleading and Counterclaim or Alternativly [sic] to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim. In a workmanlike six-page Order, U.S. District Judge Steven D. Merryday granted Ms. Lee’s motion and dismissed PSMI’s counterclaim with prejudice while reinstating PMSI’s original Answer.
Frankly, had the court held otherwise virtually every employee with computer access around the country – or rather, at least within the Middle District of Florida - would have been subject to a CFAA counterclaim if fired and thereafter attempting to sue in response. Judge Merryday’s Order notes that “[t]he CFAA is a criminal statute originally designed to target hackers who access computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer functionality, as well as criminals who possess the capacity to ‘access and control high technology processes vital to our everyday lives....’ * * * Both the letter and the spirit of the CFAA convey that the statute is not intended to cover an employee who uses the internet instead of working.”
From this second paragraph of the Order it was all downhill for PMSI. In discussing PMSI’s attempted damages hook as to Lee’s alleged “lost productivity” due to surfing the Internet the court, and I can’t help but applaud the Judge’s ability to maintain a straight face in his prose, stated “[t]he defendant asserts (dubiously) that during her six months of employment, the plaintiff caused the defendant ‘financial losses in excess of $5,000, due to her lack of productivity . . .’ (Doc. 12) The definition of ‘loss’ contemplates damage to a system or data, rather than a lack of productivity.” It’s one thing to argue zealously on behalf of one’s client; it’s quite another to attempt to stretch a statute, flawed as the CFAA is, to such lengths that an Acme Giant Rubber Band of the type favored by Wiley E. Coyote would snap.
In putting PMSI’s counterclaim to bed, the court further observed that:
“PMSI fails to show that the plaintiff ‘exceeded authorized access’ or obtained information from the computer. ‘Exceeds authorized access’ is defined as ‘to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.' 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). The counterclaim alleges that the plaintiff visited only personal websites. (Doc. 12, Pages 6 and 7) Because the only information Lee allegedly accessed was on the personal websites, not PMSI’s computer system, Lee never ‘obtained or alter[ed] information in the computer.’ Lee accessed her facebook, personal email, and news websites but did not access any information that she was ‘not entitled so to obtain or alter.’"
Applying the final thrust, Lee’s actions may have violated the company’s usage policies, in the court’s view, but PMSI’s attempted shoehorning of her conduct into the CFAA was a distinct no-go. And in a footnote aside, that fairly screamed READ THE STATUTE AND APPLICABLE CASE LAW NEXT TIME, the court dryly quipped, “18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) also requires that the information be obtained from ‘a protected computer’ which is defined as a computer ‘which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.’ 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). The defendant fails to allege that the plaintiff accessed a ‘protected computer.’"
And, with a final light touch, Judge Merryday closed with the backhand that “[e]xtension of a federal criminal statute to employee misconduct in the private sector is a legislative responsibility and not a proper occasion for aggressive statutory interpretation by the judiciary. See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2003).”
Bottom-Line
As we all know in litigation, to egregiously mangle a metaphor, sometimes the bear gets you and sometimes you get the bear. Here PMSI was more than "gotten" by the bear, as it were. Thankfully so. Still, it's a lesson as to when aggressive or sloppy representation crosses over into mere aggravation for all concerned, particularly when the often troublesome CFAA is involved.
FTC Enforcement Update: "Virtual Worlds" Operators Settle Children's Privacy Violation Charges; Pay $3M Fine
On May 12, 2011, the Federal Trade Commission announced that the operators of 20 online virtual worlds have agreed to pay $3 million to settle charges that they violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection (COPPA) Rule by collecting and disclosing personal information from hundreds of thousands of children under age 13 without their parents’ prior consent. The FTC noted that this settlement is the largest civil penalty for a violation of the FTC’s COPPA Rule.
The FTC’s COPPA Rule requires that website operators notify parents and obtain their consent before they collect, use or disclose children’s personal information. The Rule also requires that website operators post a privacy policy that is clear, understandable and complete. The FTC alleged that Playdom, Inc., a leading developer of online multi-player games, and a company executive, Howard Marks, failed to meet these requirements in violation of the Rule.
Specifically, the FTC alleged that Playdom and Marks operated 20 virtual world websites where users could access online games and other activities, including 2 Moons, 9 Dragons and My Diva Doll. The FTC alleged that at least one of these virtual worlds, Pony Stars, was a website specifically directed to children. According to the FTC, the company’s other sites intended for a general audience also attracted a significant number of children. The FTC alleged that between 2006 and 2010, approximately 403,000 children registered on the defendants’ general audience sites, and 821,000 more users registered in the Pony Stars children’s site.
The FTC complaint alleges that the sites collected children’s information, including ages and email addresses, during registration and then enabled children to publicly post their full names, email addresses, instant messenger IDs, geographic location and other information on personal profile pages and in online community forums. The FTC charged that the sites' failure to provide proper notice of these practices or obtain parents’ prior verifiable consent before collecting or disclosing children’s personal information violated the COPPA Rule.
The FTC further alleged that Playdom and Marks engaged in deceptive or unfair trade practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act because the sites' privacy policies misrepresented that the sites would prohibit children under 13 from posting personal information online.
In addition to the $3 million civil penalty, the settlement order permanently bars Playdom and Marks from violating the COPPA Rule and from misrepresenting their information practices regarding children.
Takeway
The FTC continues privacy enforcement onslaught and gets serious about COPPA. Expect more to come; the FTC announced on May 10, 2011 that it has mobile privacy enforcement settlements in the pipeline.
InfoLawGroup Speaks with Fox Live about Mobile Privacy
On May 10, 2011, the Senate Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law held a hearing on mobile privacy. We covered the hearing in detail on our blog. Yesterday, InfoLawGroup partner Boris Segalis spoke with Fox Live's Tracy Byrnes about the balance between business and consumer interests that mobile privacy implicates.
The clip from the interview is available on Fox.
Senate Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Mobile Privacy
On May 10, 2011 the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law held a hearing entitled Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphone, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy. The hearing focused on the privacy concerns raised by mobile devices, location-based mobile services, and check-in applications.
Senator Leahy opened the hearing, reflecting on the benefits of mobile devices, apps, and social networks, as well as the risks these new technologies pose to consumer privacy. Leahy expressed that he is “deeply concerned” that smartphones may be tracking and storing data without users’ consent, that sensitive user data may be maintained by providers in unencrypted formats, and that companies are involved in the sale of location data without consumer knowledge resulting in the receipt of unsolicited ads by third parties.
Subcommittee Chairman Al Franken’s opening remarks focused on the increasing number of entities whose business model is to collect and maintain information on consumers under consumers’ radar. Franken noted the many benefits of location-based services, making a point to emphasize that “the existence of this business model is not a bad thing.” “The answer is not ending location-based services,” Franken said, “what today is about is trying to find a balance” between the benefits of these services and the public’s right to privacy.
The first panel of testifying witnesses consisted of two government representatives from their respective agencies. Here are some highlights from their testimony:
Jessica Rich, Deputy Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC
- The rapid growth of mobile products and services raises several concerns: mobile devices are always on and always with the consumer, mobile devices contain information that is highly personal in nature, and companies have the ability to track consumers who use mobile devices, including children and teens.
- The FTC has called on the industry to develop simplified disclosures embedded in each mobile interaction so that consumers know when and how their data is being used, rather than rely on privacy policies that are difficult to access using a mobile device.
- Companies should implement privacy by design principles in the development of their products and services, making it easier for consumers understand and choose how their data is used.
Jason Weinstein, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, DOJ
- Three major threats mobile devices pose to consumers include (1) cyber criminals such as identity thieves, stalkers, and hackers who access and exploit information without authorization; (2) the collection and disclosure of location data by service providers themselves - including app providers; and (3) the use of mobile devices by criminals to facilitate their own crimes.
- While the ECPA restricts providers from sharing location data with the government, it does not restrict them from sharing such information with other private entities.
- Companies are not currently required to retain the data they collect, which impedes the DOJ’s ability to investigate and prosecute crimes.
The second panel consisted of five non-government witnesses – from privacy advocates to representatives from major mobile market players. Here are some highlights from their testimony:
Ashkan Soltani, Independent Researcher and Consultant
- The most serious threat mobile devices pose today is that consumers are repeatedly surprised by the information mobile device platforms and apps are accessing.
- Mobile devices and apps don’t only collect location data - they also transmit consumers’ phone numbers and information from their address books, text messages, contact lists, etc.
Justin Brookman, Director of the Project on Consumer Privacy, Center for Democracy and Technology
- Only a patchwork of outdated and insufficient laws applies to mobile service providers, leaving consumers inadequately protected.
- While companies can’t affirmatively lie about how they protect consumer data, they can decline to make any representations to consumers regarding their data privacy and security practices, thereby avoiding FTC enforcement.
- The default rule for service providers is that they can disclose location data without notifying consumers and obtaining their consent. They only things providers can’t do are things the providers have promised they won’t do.
Guy L. "Bud" Tribble, Vice President of Software Technology, Apple Inc.
- Apple does not track users’ locations and “has never done so,” nor do Apple devices transmit data back to Apple that is unique to any particular consumer.
- Apple controls the apps available to consumers by contract – if apps don’t meet Apple’s privacy requirements then those apps are not made available in Apple’s app store.
- Apple conducts “random audits” and “examines network traffic produced by applications” to ensure that available apps are properly protecting the privacy of Apple consumers.
Alan Davidson, Director of Public Policy, Americas, Google Inc.
- Google makes location-based services opt-in only. If a consumer doesn’t opt-in, his or her mobile device will not transmit any location data back to Google.
- Every third party app must notify users that the app will access location data and the user consent before the app is installed on the user’s device.
- Google believes in providing users with highly transparent information regarding its information practices, requiring opt-in consent before location data is collected, and implementing high security standards to anonymize data once it’s collected.
Jonathan Zuck, President, Association for Competitive Technology
- Mobile apps are made predominantly by small businesses - to protect consumer privacy without unduly burdening innovation, concerns about privacy must be dealt with holistically rather than from a technology-specific perspective.
Chairman Franken closed the hearing by noting that current laws don’t provide consumers with sufficient privacy protections - legislation and agency enforcement hasn’t kept up with the pace of technology. Franken restated his belief that consumers have a “fundamental right” to know what personal information is collected about them, and when and with whom their information is shared. Franken noted that these rights are particularly important when sensitive information – data from mobile devices – is involved.
To view the hearing on the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary website, click HERE.
FTC Privacy Enforcement Update: Two Companies Allegedly Failed to Protect Sensitive Employee Data
On May 3, 2011, the Federal Trade Commission announced that Ceridian Corporation and Lookout Services, Inc. agreed to settle the FTC’s allegations that the companies failed to safeguard their business customers' employee personal information. Ceridian’s services include payroll processing, payroll-related tax filing, benefits administration and other human resource services for business customers. Lookout provides a web-based computer product that is designed to help employers comply with their obligations under federal law to complete and maintain a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Form I-9 about each employee in order to verify that the employee is eligible to work in the United States.
Ceridian Allegations
The FTC alleged that the privacy and information security representations Ceridian disseminated thought the company’s website were false and misleading and, therefore, constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices that violated Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Specifically, the FTC alleged that Ceridian made the following representations regarding the privacy and confidentiality of the personal information the company collected:
Worry-free Safety & Reliability . . . When managing employee health and payroll data, security is paramount with Ceridian. Our comprehensive security program is designed in accordance with ISO 27000 series standards, industry best practices and federal, state and local regulatory requirements.
With respect to its information security measures, the Ceridian stated:
Confidentiality and Privacy: [Ceridian] shall use the same degree of care as it uses to protect its own confidential information of like nature, but no less than a reasonable degree of care, to maintain in confidence the confidential information of the [customer].
The FTC alleged that these statements were false and misleading because Ceridian:
- Stored personal information in clear, readable text;
- Created unnecessary risks to personal information by storing it indefinitely on its network without a business need;
- Did not adequately assess the vulnerability of its web applications and network to commonly known or reasonably foreseeable attacks, such as “Structured Query Language” (“SQL”) injection attacks;
- Did not implement readily available, free or low-cost defenses to such attacks; and
- Failed to employ reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access to personal information.
The FTC alleged that hackers exploited these vulnerabilities by launching an SQL injection attack on the company's website and web application. The hackers gained access to Ceridian's network and obtained customers' employee data (including bank account numbers, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth). The breach affected the personal information of at least 27,673 individuals.
Lookout Allegations
The FTC alleged similar privacy and security violations by Lookout. Specifically, the FTC alleged that Lookout made the following representations regarding the security of employee data the company maintained:
Although the data is entered via the web, your data will be encoded and transmitted over secured lines to Lookout Services server. This FTP interface will protect your data from interception, as well as, keep the data secure from unauthorized access.... Our servers are continuously monitoring attempted network attacks on a 24 x 7 basis, using sophisticated
software tools.
The FTC alleged that these representations were false and misleading and violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act because Lookout:
- Failed to establish or enforce rules sufficient to make user credentials (i.e., user ID and password) hard to guess; for example, the company did not require its customers or employees to use complex passwords to access the product database;
- Failed to require periodic changes of user credentials for customers and employees with access to sensitive personal information;
- Failed to suspend user credentials after a certain number of unsuccessful login attempts;
- Did not adequately assess and address the vulnerability of the company's web application to widely-known security flaws, such as “predictable resource location,” which enables users to easily predict patterns and manipulate the uniform resource locators (“URLs”) to gain access to secure web pages;
- Allowed users to bypass the authentication procedures on Lookout’s website when
they typed in a specific URL; - Failed to employ sufficient measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access to
computer networks, such as by employing an intrusion detection system and
monitoring system logs; and - Created an unnecessary risk to personal information by storing passwords used to
access the product database in clear text.
The FTC alleged that these deficiencies enabled an employee of a Lookout customer to gain
access to the personal information of over 37,000 individuals (including names, addresses, dates of birth and Social Security numbers). The employee obtained a URL for a secure Lookout web page during a webinar for the company's I-9 compliance solution. She subsequently typed that URL into her browser and gained access to employee personal information without having to provide valid user credential. The employee also visited Lookout’s public-facing login web page for the company's product and successfully guessed and entered several different user IDs and passwords, including the user ID “test” and the password “test.” As a result, the employee was able to access the personal information of more than 11,000 individuals. Then, by making minimal and easy-to-guess changes to the URL, the employee gained access to the entire product database, which included the personal information of more than 37,000 individuals. The FTC alleged that because Lookout did not employ an intrusion detection system until October 2009, or adequately monitor system logs until December 2009, it was unknown if other unauthorized persons accessed the personal information in the company's database before that time.
Settlements
The settlement orders bar the misrepresentations, including misleading claims about the privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of any personal information collected from or about consumers (including customers' employees). The FTC also requires the companies to implement a comprehensive information security program and to obtain independent, third party security audits every other year for 20 years.
The comprehensive security program must contain administrative, technical and physical safeguards appropriate to each company's size and complexity, the nature and scope of its activities, and the sensitivity of the information collected from or about consumers and employees.
Specifically, the consent orders require each company to:
- Designate an employee or employees to coordinate and be accountable for the information security program;
- Identify material internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality and integrity of personal information that could result in the unauthorized disclosure, misuse, loss, alteration, destruction, or other compromise of such information, and assess the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control these risks;
- Design and implement reasonable safeguards to control the risks identified through risk assessment, and regularly test or monitor the effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and procedures;
- Develop and use reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of appropriately safeguarding personal information they receive from Ceridian, and require service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate safeguards; and
- Evaluate and adjust its information security programs in light of the results of testing and monitoring, any material changes to operations or business arrangements, or any other circumstances that it knows or has reason to know may have a material impact on its information security program.
Lessons Learned
The FTC's enforcement actions against Ceridian and Lookout likely signal a two-fold expansion of the Commission's privacy and data security enforcement activities: to smaller-scale violations and violations affecting employee data. The two actions are not typical for the FTC for several reasons. First, the incidents affected a relatively small number of individuals (with no hard evidence of malicious hacking at Lookout). In addition, the enforcement actions focused on the personal information of employees rather than consumers. While consumers are the focus of an overwhelming majority of the FTC's privacy and information security enforcement, the FTC has long viewed its Section 5 jurisdiction broadly. As early as 2000, the FTC took the position that it "has the same jurisdiction in the employment-related data situation as it would generally under Section 5 of the FTC Act … [A]ssuming a case met our existing criteria (unfairness or deception) for a privacy-related enforcement action, we could take action in the employment-related data situation." With Ceridian and Lookout settlements, the FTC seems to want to dispel the notion that it is focused solely on large scale, high profile privacy and information security violations affecting consumers. This is another reason to take a hard look at your company's privacy and information security compliance.
Kerry Releases Draft of "Privacy Bill of Rights"
A week after the Senate held a hearing on the state of online consumer privacy, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass) has published a draft of the "Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011." The Act, co-sponsored by Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), directs the FTC to make rules requiring certain entities that handle information covered by the Act to comply with a host of new requirements protecting the security of the information as well as the privacy of the individuals to whom information pertains. The Act aims to enhance individual privacy protections “in a balanced way that establishes clear, consistent rules,” and “will stimulate commerce by instilling greater consumer confidence at home and greater confidence abroad.” In this post, we take a look at the highlights of the Act.
Entities Covered by the Act. The Act defines “covered entities” as any person that collects, uses, transfers or maintains covered information concerning more than 5,000 individuals during any consecutive 12-month period and is subject to FTC jurisdiction, as well as telecommunication common carriers and non-profit organizations.
Information Protected Under the Act. The various provisions of the Act address “covered information” which includes personally identifiable information (“PII”), unique identifier information (“UII”), and any information that is collected, used, or maintained in connection with PII or UII that may be used to identify an individual. Some provisions require businesses to comply with specific obligations when dealing with “sensitive” PII, which is defined as PII which, if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization could “result in harm to an individual.”
Some information is always considered PII of the individual to whom it pertains, including:
- First name (or initial) and last name;
- Residential address;
- E-mail address if it contains the individual’s name (the draft brackets indicate it is currently undecided whether that means the individual’s full name, legal name, maiden name, nickname, initials, or names embedded with other letters or characters such as Danny123@xyz.com);
- Telephone or mobile device numbers other than those considered work contact numbers;
- Social security numbers and other government-issued identification numbers
- Credit card numbers;
- Unique persistent identifiers (including cookies, user IDs, processor serial numbers, or device serial numbers) if used to identify a specific individual; and
- Biometric data, including fingerprints and retina scans.
If used, transferred, or maintained in connection with one or more pieces of PII listed above, the following information is also considered PII:
- Birth date, birth or adoption certificate number, or place of birth;
- Unique persistent identifiers (not limited to those used to identify a specific individual);
- Precise geographic location; and
- Any other information concerning an individual that may “reasonably be used to identify that individual.”
UII includes unique persistent identifiers other than those qualifying as PII, including “a customer number held in a cookie, user ID, processor serial number, or device serial number.”
Data Collection, Integrity and Retention Constraints. Covered entities may collect only as much covered information about an individual as is reasonably necessary to improve their services through research and development, provide services requested by or consented to by the individual, or to prevent fraud. Covered entities are required to establish procedures to ensure that the PII they maintain is accurate. The Act restricts the retention of covered information to a period only as long as necessary to provide a service or for a reasonable period of time if the service is ongoing.
Right to Notice. Covered entities must provide readily accessible notice regarding the collection and use of covered information as well notify individuals of any changes to the entity’s collection and use practices. The FTC will establish rules requiring a covered entity to provide individuals with a mechanism for opt-in consent for:
- The collection, use, or transfer of an individual’s sensitive PII other than to process transactions or services requested by the individual, for fraud prevention and detection, or to provide for a secure environment;
- The use or transfer of previously collected PII if there is a material change in the entity’s practices requiring notice to the individual; and
- The transfer of PII, UII, and other covered information to third parties for an unauthorized use or public display.
The FTC’s rules will also require covered entities to offer individuals a mechanism for opt-out consent for any unauthorized use of their PII.
Right to Access. Covered entities are required to provide individuals reasonable access to their PII. If an individual terminates a service or relationship with the covered entity or if the entity enters bankruptcy, individuals are given the right to demand that PII be rendered not personally identifiable or if that is not possible, to cease its collection, use, transfer or maintenance.
Constraints on Transfers to and Use by Third Parties. The Act prohibits third parties from unauthorized use of PII for which opt-in consent is required, unless the individual is notified of and consents to the use. A “third party” is a person that is not related to the covered entity by common ownership or control nor contractually required to comply with the covered entity’s privacy policies, privacy controls, and any applicable confidentiality agreement.
A covered entity is required to provide notice to individuals if the entity intends to transfer covered information to third parties. If a third party receives covered information from a covered entity, the third party is treated as a covered entity under the Act unless the FTC decides otherwise. When a transfer occurs, the covered entity and third party must enter into a contract ensuring that "the third party will not combine information that is not personally identifiable ... with other information in order to identify individuals with that information." The concept of transfer is not limited to situations where active steps are undertaken by a covered entity – it includes the collection of the information by a third party through a covered entity’s website, mobile application, or other consumer interface. Transfers to "unreliable third parties" are prohibited.
Unauthorized Use. The term ‘‘unauthorized use’’ means the use of covered information for any purpose not authorized by the individual to whom the information pertains, other than use:
- To process a transaction or service requested by that individual;
- To operate the covered entity that is providing a transaction or service requested by that individual, such as inventory management, accounting, planning, product or service improvement or forecasting;
- To prevent or detect fraud or to provide for a secure environment;
- To investigate a possible crime or that is required by law or legal process;
- To market or advertise to an individual from a covered entity if the personally identifiable information used for such marketing or advertising was collected directly by the covered entity;
- Necessary for the improvement of the transaction or service through research and development; or
- Necessary for internal operations, including collecting customer satisfaction surveys to improve customer service information as well as collection of website visit and click-through rates to improve site navigation.
Enforcement and Penalties. The FTC is granted enforcement authority and state attorneys general are given civil action authority to enforce the Act. The Act does not provide for a private right of action, which is likely to raise opposition from privacy advocates. Monetary penalties for violating the Act are stiff - a covered entity that knowingly or repeatedly violates the Act is liable for a civil penalty of $16,500 multiplied by the number of days of noncompliance. If a covered entity violates the Act and fails to obtain proper consent when required, the penalty is $16,500 multiplied by the number of days of noncompliance or the number of individuals whose consent was not obtained, whichever is greater. However, liability is capped at $2 or $3 million depending on the nature of the violation.
Effect on Other Laws. State laws are preempted by the Act, except those laws dealing with health or financial information or data breach notification.
Safe Harbor Programs. The Act requires the FTC to create requirements for “safe harbor programs.” The programs, administered by non-governmental organizations, will be designed to enable participants to implement the requirements of the Act, implement "comprehensive information privacy programs," and offer consumers a means to opt out if a participant transfers covered information to a third party for an unauthorized use. A covered entity that participates in such a program is exempt from the major provisions of the Act if, according to the FTC’s determination, the program obligates participants to comply with requirements that are substantially the same as, or more protective of privacy than, the provisions of the Act. The programs are to be supervised and enforced (with penalties) by the FTC.
With the exception of the FTC’s enforcement actions cracking down on unfair and deceptive practices, the government has favored industry self-regulation over privacy legislation. Between the new draft of the "Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011," three separate privacy bills pending in the House, and the Obama administration backing a “consumer privacy bill of rights,” it looks like change is in the air (and I’m not just saying that to be clever).
Oklahoma State House Passes Smart Grid Privacy Bill
On March 18, 2011, the Oklahoma State House passed the Electric Utility Data Protection Act (House Bill 1079). The state’s Senate will consider the bill next.
The Act seeks to establish standards to govern the use and disclosure of electric utility usage data (including personal information) by electric utilities, customers of electric utilities and third parties. The Act also requires electric utility companies to maintain the confidentiality of customer data and allow customers to access the data. State Rep. Scott Martin noted that customers will see energy savings from the Smart Grid, but are vulnerable to potential access of their data by third parties. “This legislation should ensure customers can reap the many benefits of this new system without having to fear someone getting access to their data without permission,” said Martin. The legislation is said to have the support of the Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company, which has already converted 100,000 standard meters to smart meters in the state and plans to install 800,000 smart meters in the next two years.
The proposed Data Protection Act governs the use and disclosure of “usage data” in both identifiable and aggregated format. The Act defines “usage data” as information relating to both (i) the amount of electricity consumed at a residence or customer premises; and (ii) the characteristics of that consumption. “Usage data” includes the dates and times when electricity is consumed and information about the appliances and devices that consume the electricity. The Act also provides utility customers with the right to access their usage data.
The Act deems usage data “customer-identifiable” when it is associated with any information that identifies or is uniquely associated with a customer, such as a name, Social Security or taxpayer identification number, street address, telephone number, electric utility account number, meter number or financial account information. Notably, the scope of “identifiable” data is not limited to information about individuals. Rather, the Act defines a “customer” as an individual, a business or a legal entity receiving service from an electric utility.
The Act permits utilities to use customer-identifiable usage data without customer consent for “business purposes” such as (i) the provision of services; (ii) billing; (iii) support of the infrastructure; (iv) the development, enhancement, marketing or provision of energy-related products and services; and (v) the promotion of public policy objectives, including energy efficiency and environmental initiatives.
Pursuant to the Act, a utility may disclose identifiable usage data without customer consent to affiliates and third parties that assist the utility in providing services and carrying out business objectives. The affiliate or third party that receives the usage data must agree in writing that it will maintain the confidentiality of the data and use the data only for the permissible purposes. Customer consent also is not required for disclosures of usage data to comply with legal requirements, in the event of a merger or a sale of assets, or in an emergency.
The Act also permits utilities to disclose a customer’s usage data to a third party if the customer provides an informed consent to the disclosure.
The Oklahoma bill is one of the many state-level initiatives that seek to regulate the use and disclosure of personal data that utilities and other entities collect, use and disclose in connection with the Smart Grid. We have written on our blog about the ABA’s effort to catalogue these efforts. Check back often as we continue to discuss Smart Grid-related privacy legislation and other privacy initiatives.
Privacy Enforcement Update: FTC Settles with Twitter and Chitika
As we have previously reported on our blog, 2011 has seen a whirlwind of privacy enforcement activity. The FTC, NLRB, EEOC, HHS and FINRA have all taken privacy enforcement actions this year. This March, the FTC has announced privacy settlements with Chitika and Twitter.
Chitika – FTC Alleges Deceptive Behavioral Targeting Opt-Outs
On March 14, 2011, the FTC announced that Chitika, an online advertising company, has entered into a settlement over allegations that the company did not respect consumers’ choice to opt out of receiving targeted ads online. According to the FTC complaint, Chitika buys ad space on websites and contracts with advertisers to place cookies on those websites. Chitika also uses cookies to tracks consumers’ activities on the web, including searches and visited sites.
The company displays ads to consumers based on their online activities. Chitika’s privacy policy said that consumers could opt out of having cookies placed on their browsers and receiving targeted ads. According to the FTC, however, Chitika’s opt-out lasted only 10 days. After that time, Chitika placed tracking cookies on browsers of consumers who had opted out and displayed targeted ads to them again.
The FTC charged that Chitika engaged in a deceptive practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act by tracking consumers’ online activities even after they used Chitika’s opt out mechanism to direct the company to stop tracking them online and serving targeted ads.
The settlement bars Chitika from making misleading statements about the company’s data collection practices and the extent to which consumers can control the collection, use or sharing of their data. The settlement also requires that every targeted ad Chitika displays include a link to a clear opt-out mechanism that allows a consumer to opt out for a period of at least five years. It also requires that Chitika destroy all identifiable user information collected when the defective opt out was in place. Finally, Chitika must alert consumers who previously tried to opt out that their attempt was not effective, and they should opt out again to avoid receiving targeted ads through the company.
Twitter – FTC Alleges Failure to Safeguard Personal Information
On March 11, 2011, the FTC announced final settlement with Twitter over allegations that the company deceived consumers and put their privacy at risk by failing to safeguard the security of their personal information. The FTC alleged that serious lapses in the company’s data security practices allowed hackers to obtain unauthorized administrative control of Twitter and access users’ personal information and tweets that users designated as private. The hackers also gained the ability to send tweets from any account. The FTC complaint alleged that hackers were able to gain administrative control of Twitter on at least two occasions.
According to the FTC, Twitter’s website privacy notice stated that the company “employ[s] administrative, physical, and electronic measures designed to protect your information from unauthorized access.” In addition, Twitter offered its users privacy settings that enabled them to designate their tweets as private. The FTC alleged that Twitter’s representations that the company (i) used reasonable and appropriate security measures to prevent unauthorized access to nonpublic user information, and (ii) honored users’ privacy choice were deceptive and violated Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The settlement prohibits Twitter from misleading consumers about the extent to which the company protects the security, privacy and confidentiality of nonpublic consumer information, including the extent of the measures the company takes to prevent unauthorized access to the information. Twitter also must honor the privacy choices made by consumers and establish and maintain a comprehensive information security program. The program must be assessed by an independent auditor every other year for 10 years.
Lessons Learned
With privacy enforcement on the rise, companies are well advised to take proactive approach to compliance with privacy and information security laws, regulations, guidelines and best practices. The FTC expects businesses to collect, use, disclose and process personal information in a fair and transparent way, and to accurately represent their privacy and security practices to consumers. Take a look at these Fair Information Practice Principles and think how your business can apply them to its personal information practices.
Senate Committee Holds Hearing on the State of Online Consumer Privacy
On March 16, 2011, the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a full committee hearing on the state of online consumer privacy. The hearing was the first in a series of hearings the Committee will hold on consumer privacy in the 112th Congress. The hearing focused on online commercial practices that involve collecting, maintaining, using and disseminating large amounts of consumer information, some of it potentially very sensitive and private in nature.
FTC Chairman Leibowitz was the first to testify, describing the FTC’s recent efforts to protect consumer privacy through law enforcement, education, and policy initiatives. Leibowitz then set forth some highlights from the Staff Report on consumer privacy and concluded with a discussion of issues related to the “Do Not Track” proposal. Leibowitz enumerated five critical principles that should be included in any Do Not Track system:
- Any Do Not Track system should be implemented universally, so that consumers do not have to repeatedly opt out of tracking on different sites;
- The choice mechanism should be easy to find and easy to use;
- Any choices offered should be persistent and should not be deleted if, for example, consumers clear their cookies or update their browsers;
- A Do Not Track system should not only allow consumers to opt out of advertising, it should allow them to opt out of tracking altogether; and
- A Do Not Track system should be effective and enforceable without technical loopholes.
Chairman Leibowitz testified he is “sort of agnostic whether the private sector does Do Not Track or Congress requires it.” To read the FTC’s prepared statement on the state on online consumer privacy, click HERE.
Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce, testified that “the Department has concluded that the U.S. consumer data privacy framework will benefit from legislation to establish a clearer set of rules for the road for businesses and consumers, while preserving the innovation and free flow of information that are hallmarks of the Internet.” Both the Department of Commerce and the FTC have been encouraging self-regulation, while suggesting congressional action might be needed as a backstop.
Mr. Strickling, however, urged Congress to enact new legislation setting forth baseline consumer data privacy protections—that is, a "consumer privacy bill of rights" consisting of comprehensive Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs). FIPPs should be a collection of agreed-upon principles for the handling of consumer information that would provide clear privacy protections for personal data in commercial contexts that are not covered by existing Federal privacy laws or otherwise require additional protection. Additionally, the new legislation should provide the FTC with the authority to enforce any baseline protections. Lastly, the new legislation should create a framework that provides incentives for the development of codes of conduct as well as continued innovation around privacy protections, which could include providing the FTC with the authority to offer a safe harbor for companies that implement codes of conduct that are consistent with the baseline protections. To read Mr. Strickling's testimony, click HERE.
The second panel consisted of non-government witnesses, including both consumer advocates and corporate representatives. Erich D. Andersen, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel of Microsoft, testified that “privacy is no longer about being ‘let alone.’ Privacy is about knowing what data is being collected and what is happening to it, having choices about how it is collected and used, and being confident that it is secure.” John Montgomery, Chief Operating Officer of GroupM Interaction, stated that his company “want[s] to build consumer trust in the online experience” and that “consumers should be able to choose whether and how their data is collected or used for online behavioral advertising.” Ashkan Soltani, a researcher and consultant, noted that today’s technical defenses to online tracking are not able to stop leading tracking technologies. “To be effective,” Mr. Soltani testified, “privacy protections for consumers online will likely require both a technical and policy component, working in tandem.” Barbara Lawler, the Chief Privacy Officer of Intuit, focused on the need for balance between consumer participation, the control of information, and continuing data driven innovation, stating that the key to ensuring the proper balance is “earning the customers’ trust.” Lastly, Chris Calabrese, Legislative Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, testified that if the collection of data is allowed to continue unchecked, capitalism will build “a complete surveillance state online.” “Without government intervention,” he testified, “we may soon find the internet has been transformed from a library and playground to a fishbowl, and that we have unwittingly ceded core values of privacy and autonomy.”
To view the hearing on the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation website, click HERE.
Welcome! The InformationLawGroup is Here
We are thrilled to announce the official launch of the InformationLawGroup!
The InformationLawGroup is a group of attorneys that love the law and technology. We concentrate on legal issues concerning privacy, data security, information technology, e-commerce and intellectual property. We are a full service firm addressing a broad spectrum of matters, including transactions, compliance, breach notice and incident response and litigation.
We come together today after many years in large law firm and in-house roles. We are seasoned attorneys, including former “BigLaw” lawyers, smaller practitioners with clearly defined expertise and reputation in the field, and former in-house lawyers with specific information law experience and talent. These factors result in greatly increased efficiency and better results at a significantly lower price for the firm’s clients.
So who are we? Read more after the jump.
Tanya Forsheit. Litigation is my first professional love, and privacy and data security are a close second. Prior to founding the InformationLawGroup, I was the Co-Chair of Proskauer Rose LLP’s Privacy and Data Security practice group, where I launched the firm’s Privacy Law Blog in 2007. I work with clients to address legal requirements and best practices for protecting customer and employee information. I also have extensive experience handling complex commercial and appellate litigation for corporate and individual clients before federal and state courts. In 2009, I was honored to be named one of the Daily Journal’s Top 100 women litigators in California. I am First Vice President of the Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles, I sit on the Executive Committee of the Los Angeles County Bar Association Entertainment and Intellectual Property Section, and I am co-chair of the American Bar Association’s Information Security Committee Cloud Computing Law Working Group.
David Navetta. Dave has over 12 years of legal experience, including in the areas of information security and privacy contract and policy drafting, breach notice legal services, risk management consulting and regulatory compliance. Prior to starting his own firm, InfoSecCompliance LLC in 2005, he worked as an assistant general counsel for a major insurer’s eBusiness risk group, where he analyzed and forecasted information security, privacy and technology risks and drafted policies to cover such risks. He was a litigator at the Chicago office of an international law firm prior to going in-house. He currently serves as a Co-Chair of the ABA’s Information Security Committee, and is also Co-Chair of the PCI Legal Risk and Liability Working Group. Dave is now working on a book concerning PCI contracting.
Scott Blackmer. Scott has practiced information technology law since 1982. He has been listed in several peer-reviewed directories of prominent IT lawyers, including the Legal Media Group’s Guide to the World’s Leading Technology, Media & Telecommunications Lawyers. Formerly a partner in the Washington, D.C., and Brussels offices of WilmerHale, Scott serves on the executive management team of the First Law International legal network in Brussels. He also consults on privacy, data protection and security issues in association with HR Privacy Solutions in New York and Jeitosa Group International in San Francisco. He also serves as general counsel to the Trusted Computing Group, XDI.org, and OpenID Foundation, and he counsels other industry associations, corporations and entrepreneurs. He has advised federal and state agencies as well as the European Commission on privacy and security issues, and he currently serves as a privacy advisor to the U.S. Social Security Administration. Scott also arbitrates Internet domain name disputes brought before the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva. Over his long career, he has worked on transactions and licensing, compliance issues, litigation, and arbitration matters in over 100 countries.
All three of us frequently speak and write on privacy and data security issues. Dave and I are both Certified Information Privacy Professionals through the International Association of Privacy Professionals.
We have successfully served a diverse range of clients: from large Fortune 500 multinationals and name-brand traditional brick-and-mortar companies, to small start-ups and technology service providers. Our law practice uses an integrated approach combining technology and administrative controls, legal compliance, contractual vendor management and risk.
We look forward to meeting you soon!





